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THE OPIOID CRISIS OR CLIMATE CHANGE: WHICH IS MORE LIKELY TO 
SUCCEED UNDER THE TOBACCO LITIGATION MODEL?  




Societal problems can occasionally have legal solutions, and several tools exist to imple-
ment change, including litigation and regulation. However, what elements make a societal prob-
lem more suitable for litigation or regulation? This Article examines four different societal issues 
(tobacco use, obesity, opioid addiction, and climate change) to determine whether litigation or 
regulation is the more appropriate route for success. The tobacco litigation serves as a successful 
example, while the fast food litigation serves as an unsuccessful example. Six signs of success are 
derived from the tobacco litigation: a large settlement agreement, evidence of corporate wrong-
doing, change in public opinion, the litigation inspiring regulations, new courtroom avenues, and 
the ability to aggregate claims. The Article concludes that opioid litigation will be more successful 
under the tobacco litigation model than climate change litigation, because opioid litigation adapts 
the tobacco model to end the opioid epidemic. Novel solutions include utilizing Multi-District Lit-
igation and the first-ever “negotiation class” that allows all 30,000 American cities to participate 
in a global settlement agreement with Big Pharma. 
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“Our purpose was to change the world,” Richard Scruggs, a plaintiffs’ lawyer during the 
tobacco litigation, commented.1 This quote shows the powerful goal behind the tobacco litigation 
and why the suit’s success inspired Deborah Hensler to coin the term “social policy tort.”2 The 
tobacco litigation contains one of the most expensive settlements in American legal history and 
has an ample platform to analyze present and future social policy torts.3    
Social policy torts are a type of litigation seeking “industry-wide changes in corporate 
products and practices.”4 Normally, a judge’s role is limited to dyadic issues between two parties, 
but social policy torts allow judges to take on polycentric issues usually assigned to legislators.5 
In these suits, public officials, private attorneys, and advocacy groups take on industries that have 
avoided liability for their harmful products or practices.6 These advocates consider adjudication 
the first step to encourage new legislation, change public opinion, and uncover the truth about 
wrongful corporate conduct.7 Social policy tort suits differ from social impact litigation, which 
seeks to wrong pervasive societal harms such as racial segregation, as seen in Brown v. Board of 
Education,8 because social policy tort attorneys seek billions of dollars in damages in addition to 
advocating for societal changes.9 The foremost example of a successful social policy tort suit is 
the tobacco litigation.10    
This Article shows how the ongoing opioid litigation is likely to follow in the tobacco 
litigation’s successful footsteps, while climate change litigation likely will not. Part II examines 
why the tobacco litigation was so successful. A framework of six “signs of success” is then derived 
from the tobacco litigation: a global settlement agreement, evidence of corporate wrongdoing, 
change in public opinion, the litigation inspiring regulations, new courtroom avenues, and the abil-
ity to aggregate claims. Part III analyzes why the fast food litigation was unsuccessful, despite 
 
1 Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2099 (2004). 
2 Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strategy Some Preliminary 
Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 495 (2001).  
3 Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 511, 512 (2001). 
4 Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale 
Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 179, 207 (2001).  
5 See Jeb Barnes, In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Un-
certainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 8 (2009).  
6 See Hensler, supra note 4, at 206−07.    
7 See generally Barnes, supra note 5.  
8 Lara Bergthold & Felix Schein, Moving Forward Social Causes Through Impact Litigation, HUFFPOST (Sept. 
10, 2013, 7:17 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/moving-forward-social-causes-through-impact-litiga-
tion_b_3582680 [https://perma.cc/C3WL-8PT9]; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).  
9 Hensler, supra note 4, at 207. 
10 See id. at 207–09.   
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appearing like the tobacco litigation on the surface. Applying the tobacco framework here empha-
sizes the importance of finding evidence of corporate wrongdoing, suggesting an attenuated cau-
sation link between the harm and the corporations’ actions will prevent any effective litigation. 
The fast food litigation also sheds light on corporations utilizing false marketing to appease public 
opinion, and shows that plaintiffs are less likely to succeed when suing heavily regulated corpora-
tions. Part IV applies the tobacco framework to the opioid litigation and analyzes three unique 
elements of opioid litigation: the Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”), the negotiation class, and a 
positive public nuisance precedent in state court. Part V analyzes the recent Juliana v. United 
States and the California v. B.P. P.L.C. decisions and applies the tobacco framework to the climate 
change litigation. Part VI explains why the opioid litigation is more likely to succeed under the 
new tobacco model than the climate change litigation. While both litigations have most or all the 
signs of success, the opioid litigation is more likely to succeed for three reasons. First, climate 
change public nuisance suits are currently pending in state court, while a state court already found 
an opioid manufacturer liable for public nuisance. Second, Big Pharma companies have settled 
with harmed cities and states in the opioid litigation, but Big Oil has not in the climate change 
litigation. Third, federal courts are unwilling to adjudicate climate change issues, while a federal 
court created an MDL and a negotiation class for the opioid litigation. While the opioid crisis is 
more likely to be resolved with a large global settlement, the results of the climate change litigation 
surpass the fast food litigation’s success rate. Both courts and Big Oil acknowledge that climate 
change is real and that emissions contribute to climate change, the public more readily believes 
climate change is occurring, and Juliana suggests that the political branches of government can no 
longer ignore climate change.  
 
II. THE SUCCESS OF THE TOBACCO LITIGATION 
 
The American tobacco litigation model has been so successful that other countries are 
clamoring to implement similar techniques.11 The World Health Organization deems the American 
tobacco litigation a success due to the “massive financial recoveries” and how it “shap[ed] and 
educat[ed] the public.”12 The American Tobacco litigation spanned five decades and did not see 
success until the 1990s, during the third wave of litigation.13 This Part compares the first and sec-
ond unsuccessful waves of litigation with the third wave of litigation to determine what changes 







11 D. DOUGLAS BLANKE, WHO, TOWARDS HEALTH WITH JUSTICE: LITIGATION AND PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS TOOLS 
FOR TOBACCO CONTROL 12 (2002), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/200788/EMRPUB_2002_EN_ 
854.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WHR-JQWY] (stating that tobacco is still very much a global issue: “One-third of the 
world’s adults smoke cigarettes, and half of these smokers will die prematurely.”); see generally Andrei Sirabi-
onian, Why Tobacco Litigation Has Not Been Successful in the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Tobacco 
Litigation in the United States and the United Kingdom, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 485 (2005); Heather Cooper, To-
bacco Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and European Community Approaches to Combatting 
the Hazards Associated with Tobacco Products, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 275 (1990).  
12 BLANKE, supra note 11, at 13.  
13 Id. at 16, 23–24.  
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A. Unsuccessful First Wave—Unforeseeability Defense (1954–1964) 
 
The first tobacco litigation case, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., was filed in 
1954.14 Pritchard and other first wave cases were brought by individual plaintiffs on “theories of 
fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty.”15 Most plaintiffs had lung cancer and sought monetary 
damages from the tobacco companies for “medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.”16 
Judges dismissed almost all the first wave cases before trial, and those cases that did make it to 
trial were unsuccessful.17 The tobacco companies’ victories during this era are explained by two 
tactics: (1) denying the causal link between using tobacco and any disease, like lung cancer, and 
(2) arguing that they had no duty to warn customers because they had no knowledge or notice of 
any adverse health consequences related to smoking.18  
The first defense, lack of causation, was based on the alleged absence of scientific evidence 
linking cancer to cigarette usage. Shortly before Pritchard in 1950, scientists began publishing 
landmark studies linking lung cancer and cigarettes.19 However, these reports had little effect as 
cigarette manufacturers denied these findings, and some health professionals found them incon-
clusive.20 Also, the studies did not affect the public opinion of cigarettes, as “smoking remained a 
ubiquitous part of popular culture” and “was accepted in almost every setting, from the courts to 
the Congress to medical offices.”21 Because public opinion did not change, this likely affected the 
result in jury trials.   
The 1963 Fifth Circuit case, Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., illustrates the second 
defense that tobacco companies were not liable because the cancerous side effects of smoking were 
unforeseeable.22 The case was brought by a widow, whose husband was a heavy smoker and died 
of lung cancer, on the claims of negligence and breach of warranty.23 Reynolds and Liggett & 
Myers, manufacturers of several cigarette brands, pleaded a general denial, along with assumption 
of the risk and contributory negligence defenses.24 The court explained that a cigarette manufac-
turer is only strictly liable for foreseeable harm.25 In application, the court stated: “[I]t cannot be 
said that cigarette smokers who started smoking before the great cancer-smoking debate relied on 
the tobacco companies’ ‘warranty’ that their cigarettes had no carcinogenic element. . . . [T]he 
manufacturer is not an insurer against the unknowable.”26    
 
14 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 486.   
15 Id.  
16 BLANKE, supra note 11, at 16. 
17 Id. at 17.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 16.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 40 (5th Cir. 1963).  
23 Id. at 22.  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 39.   
26 Id. at 39–40.  
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 In addition to these defenses, individual plaintiffs could not match the financial superiority 
and strategy of Big Tobacco’s legal teams.27 One of Big Tobacco’s tactics was draining the plain-
tiff’s resources early on by making excessive discovery requests.28  
 
B. Unsuccessful Second Wave—Free Will Defense (1964–1990) 
 
The beginning of the second wave was marked by the government showing the dangers of 
tobacco. A 1964 Surgeon General report linked smoking to “deadly diseases, including lung can-
cer, emphysema, and bronchitis.”29 Also, the report demanded congressional action because it de-
termined smoking “was a ‘health hazard of sufficient importance.’”30 Congress responded by re-
quiring the following label on cigarettes: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your 
Health.”31 The Labeling Act preempted state common law claims regarding the adequacy of the 
warning on cigarette labels or any cigarette advertising.32 The Act preempted the claims because 
Congress decided that cigarettes were “a lawful product” that could be marketed nationally, so 
long as the cigarettes had the mandated warning.33 Therefore, the improved scientific evidence in 
the Surgeon General’s report helped remove the first wave causation defense, but the Labeling Act 
created an entirely new defense—the common knowledge or free will defense.34      
This new defense came from the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts.35 Section 402(a) 
made sellers strictly liable for the physical harm caused by a product they sold if the product was 
“in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous” to the user.36 Despite causing dangerous health 
effects, the Restatement indicated that strict liability law should not apply to cigarettes because the 
adverse health effects are common knowledge, lumping them in the same category as alcohol and 
butter.37  
The public opinion during the second wave reinforced this defense by putting the respon-
sibility on the smoker.38 Juries and courts still believed it was the smoker’s lifestyle choice that 
caused him harm, and therefore Big Tobacco was not liable.39 This is partly because the danger of 
smoking seemed to be common knowledge; evidence shows that the earliest condemnation of 
 
27 Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congres-
sional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 703, 710–11 (1999). Big Tobacco is made 
up of the “Big Five” companies: Liggett-Myers, R. J. Reynolds and Brown and Williamson, American Tobacco, 
Brown and Williamson, and Philip Morris. W. W. Yeargin, Tobacco, NC PEDIA (2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/to-
bacco-part-3-rise-big-tobacco [https://perma.cc/9Y4C-UP5E]. 
28 Bianchini, supra note 27, at 711.  
29 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 487.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 487–88.  
32 Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The “New” Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation—Is Anything Really So 
New?, 54 TENN. L. REV. 551, 566–67 (1987).  
33 Id. at 568.  
34 See id. at 577.  
35 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 488–89 (noting that the seller would be liable for the harm done, even if the seller 
“has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product”).  
36 Id. at 489.  
37 Crist & Majoras, supra note 32, at 552–53, 558 (noting it is important that the official comment appeared in 
1962, before the Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee’s Report of 1964, but was affirmed after the Report was 
published).  
38 Id. at 552. 
39 Id.  
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smoking dates back to 1604.40 American law first acknowledged the public’s knowledge of the 
danger of cigarettes in the 1900 Supreme Court case Austin v. Tennessee: “cigarette’s deleterious 
effects have become very general and communications are constantly finding their way into public 
press.”41 If the danger of smoking was common knowledge, it makes sense why individual plain-
tiffs had such a difficult time defeating this defense. In fact, the second wave’s Labeling Act made 
the situation worse because anyone that smoked cigarettes after reading the warning assumed the 
risk of smoking.42  
 
C. Successful Third Wave (1990–Present) 
 
1. Six Signs of Success 
 
The tobacco litigation is heeded as the most successful social policy tort lawsuit,43 and 
Deborah Hensler’s creation of the term “social policy tort” was directly inspired by the litigation.44 
This Article determines six “signs of success,” which are rooted in the third wave of the tobacco 
litigation. The signs are a large global settlement agreement,45 evidence of corporate wrongdoing,46 
change in public opinion,47 the litigation inspiring regulations,48 new courtroom avenues,49 and the 
ability to aggregate claims.50 The signs are explained in more detail below. 
The first and main goal of social policy torts is “reimbursement of government expendi-
tures allegedly incurred as a result of injuries due to the manufacturers’ practices.”51 The tobacco 
litigation saw success when Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota negotiated settlements 
with Big Tobacco exceeding $36 billion.52 However, the most successful settlement was the Mas-
ter Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), an agreement between forty-six state attorneys general, five 
 
40 Id. at 553–54 (“One of the earliest written efforts encouraging smokers to quit . . . was published in 1604 [by] 
England’s King James I . . . stat[ing] that smoking is ‘a custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to 
the brain, dangerous to the lungs.’”).     
41 Id. at 559 (cleaned up) (quoting Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 348 (1900)).   
42 See Bianchini, supra note 27, at 710.  
43 John Gray, The Use of Public Nuisance Suits to Address Climate Change: Are These Really “Ordinary Tort 
Cases?”, in THE LEGAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ch. 7 (2010 ed.), 2010 WL 1616860, at *1; see Hensler, supra 
note 2, at 494–95; see Hensler, supra note 4, at 207–09.  
44 See Hensler, supra note 2, at 495.  
45 See Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR.,  https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/com-
mercial-tobacco-control/commercial-tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/TE5C-JNLM] [hereinafter PUB. HEALTH]. 
46 See generally Clive Bates & Andy Rowell, Tobacco Explained: The Truth About the Tobacco Industry . . . in 
Its Own Words, WHO, https://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/TobaccoExplained.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8TL-
HK94]. 
47 See K. Michael Cummings & Robert N. Proctor, The Changing Public Image of Smoking in the United States: 
1964–2014, 23 CANCER, EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 32 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1158/1055-
9965.EPI-13-0798. 
48 See BLANKE, supra note 11, at 11. 
49 See Barnes, supra note 5, at 13–14.  
50 Paul A. LeBel, “Of Deaths Put on by Cunning and Forced Cause”: Reality Bites the Tobacco Industry, 38 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 623–26 (1997); Rustad, supra note 3, at 512 (noting that the inability for the tobacco 
litigation to certify class actions was an obstacle to success). 
51 Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 888 (2001).  
52 Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and 
Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).  
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U.S. territories, Washington, D.C., and four of the largest American cigarette manufacturers.53 The 
settlement limited companies’ advertising and manufacturing, and required them to pay billions of 
dollars to the states annually.54  
Second, social policy torts are not just about financial penalties, and arguably the most 
important element of success in these suits is uncovering the truth.55 A main goal is to foster cor-
porate responsibility,56 and a way to achieve this is to reveal companies’ wrongdoings to the public 
so they are forced to change. During the third wave of the tobacco litigation, the Minnesota Attor-
ney General highlighted the importance of discovering the truth by insisting that his state would 
only settle if the tobacco industry agreed to make the 35 million documents found during discovery 
public.57 This set a precedent, requiring all future tobacco settlements to make internal documents 
public, which resulted in the MSA containing a similar requirement.58 As explained in the next 
Section, evidence of corporate wrongdoing was also necessary to defeat Big Tobacco’s defenses.59 
Additionally, courts required scientific evidence showing cigarettes caused harm to establish the 
causation element in successful third wave suits brought by individuals.60 The importance of pub-
licizing companies’ internal documents is not unique to the tobacco litigation, as it was also rec-
ognized as a sign of success in the mass asbestos products litigation.61    
Third, a change of public opinion is important because it affects the outcome of jury trials, 
and consumers of dangerous products can vote with their wallets to decrease the prevalence of 
smoking or other harmful actions and results of using the contentious product. There has been a 
drastic decrease in use of cigarettes: Gallup polls show that in 1954, 45% of those polled smoked 
a cigarette “in the last week,” whereas the total was only 15% in 2019.62 Additionally, the appre-
ciation of cigarettes’ dangerous effects has increased: in 1994, 36% of those polled designated 
cigarettes as very harmful, whereas the total was 58% in 2019.63   
Fourth, meaningful change can occur when judges allow new courtroom avenues rather 
than deferring to a different branch of government to solve the issue, such as Congress.64 The 
tobacco litigation spawned new courtroom avenues for individual plaintiffs, including the “addic-
tion-as-injury” theory65 and allowed Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims, 
as explained in the next Section, based on uncovered evidence of corporate wrongdoing.66 
 
53 PUB. HEALTH, supra note 45.   
54 Id.  
55 Stanton Glantz, Lawsuits Against Companies Aren’t Just About Getting Money. They’re About Revealing the 
Truth., WASH. POST (September 9, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/09/lawsuits-
against-companies-arent-just-about-getting-money-theyre-about-revealing-truth/ [https://perma.cc/M7JR-JMZL]; see 
Rustad, supra note 3, at 511.  
56 Erichson, supra note 1, at 2102.   
57 Glantz, supra note 55.  
58 Id. 
59 See Bianchini, supra note 27, at 711; Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531 (1992). 
60 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 487, 492 n.52, 493.  
61 Barnes, supra note 5, at 21.  
62 Tobacco and Smoking, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1717/tobacco-smoking.aspx [https://perma.cc/- 
84YR-Z69M].  
63 Id.  
64 See Barnes, supra note 5, at 14. 
65 Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336, 1342 (1999).  
66 See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding numerous tobacco 
defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 
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Fifth, social policy tort litigation has the unique goal of making industry-wide changes, a 
job usually limited to federal and state legislatures.67 One author explains that social policy torts 
utilize adjudication as a first step to influence legislation.68 This defining characteristic clearly 
shows the difference between traditional civil class actions and social policy torts.69 For example, 
in individual tobacco cases the goal is only making the plaintiff whole through damages; whereas 
the attorneys general negotiating the MSA required substantial reforms, including limiting youth 
marketing techniques and outdoor advertising.70 Also, several states enacted higher taxes on to-
bacco products, which continues to deter smoking.71 Another deterrence is the increase of second-
hand smoking statutes preventing smoking in certain public areas.72 In 2009, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) took over complete regulation of tobacco products.73 The phenomenon 
of adjudication influencing legislation also occurred in the gun and health-care insurance suits 
brought by states and municipalities.74 
Sixth, the ability to certify class actions and aggregate claims is another powerful tool to 
defeat corporations.75 The rationale behind this is that individual plaintiffs often lack the resources 
to go after the large corporations targeted by social policy torts.76 For example, during the tobacco 
litigation, “a confidential tobacco industry internal legal memo . . . stated, ‘The goal in litigation 
is not to spend all of our money, but to force the plaintiffs to spend all of their money.’”77 Other 
methods of aggregating claims include states and municipalities suing on behalf of individuals 
under parens patriae standing, which was used during the tobacco litigation,78 or creating a nego-
tiation class.79    
 
2. What Elements Led to This Success? 
 
Achieving the six signs of success throughout the third wave of tobacco litigation depended 
on new plaintiffs, new evidence, and new legal avenues.80 Plaintiffs finally defeated Big Tobacco 
 
67 Hensler, supra note 4, at 207.  
68 Barnes, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
69 Hensler, supra note 2, at 498. 
70 Master Settlement Agreement, § III(a)–(c), https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/re-
sources/master-settlement-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVY3-8DEG] (noting that specifically the MSA specified 
Big Tobacco stop targeting youth with advertising, remove cartoons from their advertising (ex: “Joe Camel”), and 
limit the use of sponsorships at events where a large percentage of the audience are youth).   
71 See LeBel, supra note 50, at 635–42.   
72 Cummings & Proctor, supra note 47, at 33.  
73 Federal Regulation of Tobacco, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/commer-
cial-tobacco-control/federal-regulation-tobacco [https://perma.cc/68JZ-8CUH].  
74 See Hensler, supra note 2, at 498. 
75 LeBel, supra note 50, at 623–26; see Rustad, supra note 3, at 512.  
76 Bianchini, supra note 27, at 710–11. 
77 Historic Tobacco Case Revisited: Biggest Litigation Win Ever or a Complete Scam?, DALL. MORNING NEWS 
(Apr. 15, 2016, 2:54 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/2016/04/15/historic-tobacco-case-revisited-biggest-
litigation-win-ever-or-a-complete-scam/ [https://perma.cc/9AQJ-XJAW].  
78 John B. Hoke, Parens Patriae: A Flawed Strategy for State-Initiated Obesity Litigation, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1753, 1757 (2013). 
79 Deborah Hensler, Opioid Negotiation Class May Be Organic Procedure Evolution, STAN. L. SCH. (Oct. 1, 
2019), https://law.stanford.edu/2019/10/01/opioid-negotiation-class-may-be-organic-procedure-evolution/?sf11018- 
7564=1 [https://perma.cc/B6JP-GBZT]. 
80 BLANKE, supra note 11, at 24.  
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because juries and courts began to focus less on the effect of tobacco, and more on the conduct of 
the companies.81  
 
a. Attorneys General Become the New Plaintiffs 
 
The government’s involvement “reach[ed] an all time high” during the third wave of liti-
gation.82 The governmental action that impacted this wave had less to do with legislation and more 
to do with city and state governments filing numerous suits beginning in 1994.83 Leading up to 
1998, almost every state filed an action, resulting in several settlement agreements.84 The influence 
and resources of the attorneys general suing on behalf of states far outweighed that of the individ-
ual plaintiffs suing in the previous two waves of litigation.85 The potential pay-out also far ex-
ceeded that of individual damages; in fiscal year 2019, the states that participated in the MSA 
cumulatively collected $27.3 billion.86  
To sue Big Tobacco, state attorneys general relied on the common law doctrine of parens 
patriae.87 This doctrine allows “a state attorney general [to] bring an action against a party that has 
harmed the health or economic well being” of its state citizens.88 Because the states were not a 
direct victim of Big Tobacco, the attorneys general had to plead claims different than the original 
individual plaintiffs.89 On theories of state consumer protection, antitrust,90 and state public nui-
sance laws,91 states argued that tobacco companies contributed to health problems and created 
significant costs in state health-care systems.92 By using public nuisance and similar claims, states 
did not have to prove causation related to an individual citizen’s illness, and thus eliminated Big 
Tobacco’s previous defenses based on individual actions, such as assumption of the risk and con-
tributory negligence.93 Instead, the states only had to show harm to themselves; for example, the 
$50 billion spent in health-care costs caring for smokers between 1976 and 1993.94 Additionally, 
states argued that the costs incurred to help smokers were involuntary, defeating the assumption 
 
81 Id.  
82 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 490.  
83 BLANKE, supra note 11, at 25.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 12.  
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of the risk defense.95 Payment for these harms is part of the MSA, which paid and continues to pay 
billions of dollars to state governments to treat and prevent smoking-related illnesses.96  
 
b. Smoking Gun Documents Disprove Unforeseeability Defense 
 
Besides increased health-care costs, what happened in 1994 to inspire attorneys general to 
file these lawsuits? Dr. David A. Kessler, the FDA commissioner at the time, investigated whether 
tobacco was a “drug” the FDA could regulate.97 While the Supreme Court held in a 5–4 decision 
that tobacco was not a “drug” the FDA could regulate, the fact-finding process resulted in testi-
mony and new documentary evidence showing that Big Tobacco knew tobacco caused cancer and 
was addictive.98 Evidence also emerged in 1994 from two tobacco industry “whistleblowers.”99 In 
documents that became known as the “cigarette papers,” one paralegal and a former tobacco ex-
ecutive leaked damaging documents from Brown & Williamson Corporation to the media and 
federal regulatory authorities.100 These two events led to a congressional inquiry, in which seven 
tobacco chief executive officers testified under oath and “den[ied] that cigarettes addict smokers 
or cause disease.”101 Contrary to this testimony, Congress already possessed the companies’ inter-
nal documents stating the industry “understood the carcinogenic nature of its product since the 
1950s” and knew of its addictive nature since the 1960s.102 This evidence of knowledge directly 
contradicted the first wave defense that Big Tobacco did not foresee the carcinogenic effects of 
tobacco use.103   
 
c. Free Will Defense Disproved and New Courtroom Avenues 
 
The free will defense was first attacked in 1992 when the Supreme Court decided that the 
1965 Labeling Act did not preempt state damage awards regarding “express warranty, intentional 
fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.”104 The holding suggests that the label alone was not 
a sufficient warning for the risks associated with smoking. Additionally, the defense was fully 
eradicated when documents revealed that the industry knew of the addictive quality of cigarettes, 
purposefully increased the addictive nature of them, and targeted advertising at children.105 The 
loss of this defense also allowed two new courtroom avenues.  
Originally pled in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., the first new courtroom avenue was 
based on Big Tobacco fraudulently concealing tobacco’s addictive quality.106 This argument be-
came known as the “addiction-as-injury” claim and directly refuted the idea “that smokers volun-
tarily choose to smoke.”107 The argument also greatly expanded who can sue because under this 
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96 Master Settlement Agreement, TRUTH INITIATIVE, https://truthinitiative.org/who-we-are/our-history/master-set-
tlement-agreement [https://perma.cc/F4VD-Q4SC]; PUB. HEALTH, supra note 45.  
97 Sirabionian, supra note 11, at 490. 
98 Id. at 490, 492–93.  
99 BLANKE, supra note 11, at 21.   
100 Id. at 21 n.16. 
101 Id. at 22. 
102 Bates & Rowell, supra note 46. 
103 See Bianchini, supra note 27, at 710. 
104 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 531 (1992).  
105 Bates & Rowell, supra note 46, at 15, 24.  
106 Kearns, supra note 65, at 1341–42.  
107 Id. at 1342.  
Volume 8 Texas A&M Law Review Arguendo 2021 
 
 37 
theory, the plaintiff must only be addicted and not actually suffer any health issues.108 The damages 
for addiction instead derived from “medical monitoring and emotional distress, along with dis-
gorgement of the industry’s profits.”109 Focusing on the addictive quality of tobacco defeated Big 
Tobacco’s previous claims that smokers freely chose to smoke.110 “These ‘assumption of risk’ and 
‘comparative fault’ arguments were becoming less persuasive as evidence grew that tobacco was 
addictive, and that tobacco companies understood, exploited, and even enhanced this addiction.”111    
Additionally, courts more readily accepted that smoking was not a choice because of Big 
Tobacco’s child-targeted advertising.112 The general theory was that once children reached adult-
hood, they were already addicted to cigarettes because childhood advertising removed their ability 
to choose to smoke as an adult.113 Data from the late 1990s indicates that “ninety percent of adult 
smokers became addicted before their nineteenth birthday and a majority of smokers began smok-
ing before they were fourteen years old.”114 The MSA reiterates the importance of this targeted 
advertising, as creating “policies designed to reduce Youth smoking” was listed as one of the three 
main uses for the states’ settlement money.115   
In 1996, the first individual plaintiff won against a cigarette manufacturer, receiving 
$750,000 in damages.116 The verdict was a surprise and relied in part on the new addiction the-
ory.117 Additionally, this was the first suit to reach a jury after Congress and the media released 
evidence of Big Tobacco’s corporate wrongdoing.118 The plaintiff was a lung cancer survivor but 
relied on the powerful addiction theory to win the case.119 The power of this new legal theory and 
evidence discussed in the previous Subsection is very clear because lawsuits brought by individual 
plaintiffs during the first and second wave failed.120 The verdict caused tobacco companies’ stock 
prices to crash, influencing the companies to settle with U.S. states in 1997 and 1998.121 Settle-
ments also required tobacco warning labels stating “smoking is addictive.”122 
The second new courtroom avenue involved the DOJ bringing Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims against several tobacco companies.123 In 2006, a D.C. 
federal district court determined that the companies violated RICO by “fraudulently covering up 
the health risks associated with smoking and marketing their products to children.”124 The Fourth 
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Circuit upheld the RICO violation in 2009.125 Litigators emphasize that the 1,683 page opinion 
detailing Phillip Morris’s and other tobacco companies’ wrongs would have been impossible with-
out the release of the smoking gun documents.126 While the RICO prosecution did not encourage 
the MSA,127 it was another way to punish Big Tobacco and ensure the public knew the truth about 
its harmful products. For example, part of the court ruling required tobacco companies to issue 
“corrective statements” in the form of advertisements.128      
 
D. Framework for Future Social Policy Torts 
 
Examining the tobacco litigation shows what elements influenced the success of the third 
wave. The first successful element, a large global settlement, was attained because of the states’ 
combined financial resources and ability to sidestep previous defenses, finally leveling the playing 
field with Big Tobacco in a way that individual plaintiffs could not.129 Attorneys general may sue 
on behalf of their states’ citizens through parens patriae standing, which requires attorneys general 
to show that some harm occurred to the health or economic well-being of their states’ citizens.130 
In the case of tobacco, the harm required for standing was shown by exorbitant health-care costs.131  
The second successful element was evidence of an industry’s deceptive conduct. Big To-
bacco’s deceptive conduct was revealed through settlement disclosure requirements, a congres-
sional investigation, whistleblowers releasing documents, and the FDA trying to regulate to-
bacco.132 Litigation could also reveal deceptive conduct through discovery, but litigators admit 
this is “a long and arduous process.”133 There should also be significant causation evidence linking 
the product to the health or economic harm, which first was discovered during the second wave 
through the Surgeon General’s report linking deadly diseases and smoking.134 Additionally, the 
smoking gun documents in the third wave showed tobacco companies knew of the addictive qual-
ity and harmful health effects of cigarettes, and that they purposefully advertised to children and 
made cigarettes more addictive.135  
This evidence led to the third successful element, a change in public opinion, which influ-
enced jury decisions. This evidence also backed the fourth element: new courtroom avenues. First, 
the Supreme Court determined that state claims under the Labeling Act were no longer 
preempted.136 Second, third wave plaintiffs could argue that they did not choose to smoke because 
of the addictive nature and targeted child marketing.137 Third, the smoking gun documents allowed 
criminal prosecution of Big Tobacco in federal courts under RICO.138 The fifth element of success 
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was influencing a productive body of legislation. The third wave achieved this by including spe-
cific provisions in the settlement requiring regulation, prompting second-hand smoke statutes and 
higher tax legislation.139 Last, the tobacco litigation was able to aggregate claims and level the 
playing field between Big Tobacco and plaintiffs through parens patriae standing.140   
 
III. THE UNSUCCESSFUL FAST FOOD LITIGATION 
 
This Part examines why the fast food litigation of the early 2000s was less successful than 
the tobacco litigation, despite the social harm from fast food having surface-level similarities to 
the harm Big Tobacco caused.141   
 
A. Summary of the Litigation 
 
In the 2002 class action Barber v. McDonald’s Corp., Cesar Barber, a fifty-six year old 
obese man, served as lead plaintiff.142 He argued that fast food chains intentionally withheld nu-
trition information,143 causing him to unknowingly eat unhealthy food regularly since 1975,144 and 
that he suffered from two heart attacks and diabetes as a result.145 Mr. Barber’s lawyer, Samuel 
Hirsch, tabled this case before it reached judgment because he felt that an adult should have a 
better sense of personal responsibility than the children he represented in his next suit, Pelman v. 
McDonald’s.146 Additionally, Barber received media ridicule, claiming that obesity from fast food 
was only due to a lack of self-control.147 While Barber was not adjudicated, the lawyer’s and 
public’s opinion emulates the second wave defenses of free will and common knowledge. The 
plaintiff chose to eat these foods, and now he must suffer the consequences.  
Pelman was a class action suit brought by the parents of two obese teenagers.148 The argu-
ments were that McDonald’s engaged in false advertising and that fast food made the teenagers 
obese.149 The judge summarily dismissed the suit, noting that the dangers of fast food are well 
known and that the advertisements created by McDonald’s were not misleading.150 The judge di-
rectly compared the suit to the third wave of the tobacco litigation: “As the successful to-
bacco class action litigation and settlements have shown . . . the fact that excessive smoking was 
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known to lead to health problems did not vitiate liability when . . . tobacco companies had inten-
tionally altered the nicotine levels of cigarettes to induce addiction.”151 Barber and Pelman show 
that the public believes health issues from fast food result from choice, which aligns closely with 
the second wave of the tobacco litigation.   
Despite these suits mirroring the first and second waves of tobacco litigation, the fast food 
litigation did not end with a successful third wave. The reasons for the lack of success rely on these 
key differences: the attenuated causation link, the lack of evidence discussing wrongful conduct 
of Big Fast Food, marketing strategies employed by Big Fast Food, and more comprehensive leg-
islation of fast food under the FDA.     
 
B. Applying the Framework to Fast Food 
 
The first sign of success is a large settlement agreement. Similar to the first and second 
waves of tobacco litigation, only individuals (albeit organized as class actions) have brought cases 
against fast food companies and were met with similar free will defenses.152 After the failure of 
the private litigation, citizens have urged attorneys general to sue fast food under the parens pa-
triae doctrine,153 which was a major turning point for the tobacco litigation. Similar to the tobacco 
litigation, states have suffered economic harm as a result of obesity; according to an article pub-
lished in 2012, Americans spent $190 million in medical costs fighting obesity.154 However, fast 
food suits would likely fail because the main theory used in the parens patriae standing is not 
appropriate for obesity suits.155   
The main reason parens patriae would fail in the obesity setting is because of the attenuated 
causal link between the consumption of fast food and the harms caused by obesity.156 While this 
type of standing does not require the state to prove the corporation caused individual citizens’ 
injuries, it still must show that Big Fast Food caused economic harm (obesity health-care costs).157 
In the case of tobacco, scientific evidence made it fairly clear that smoking caused diseases such 
as lung cancer.158 Additionally, it was easy to trace the harms to the tobacco defendants because 
the four parties to the MSA made up almost 100% of the tobacco manufacturing industry, and 
customers are normally loyal to one brand.159 In contrast, several factors can cause obesity, includ-
ing “caloric intake, environment, genetics, diseases, and drug use.”160 Also, there are far more than 
four chains in the fast food sphere, and an obese person may eat at several of them.161 For these 
reasons, the causal link is not tight enough to encourage attorneys general to sue as they did in the 
tobacco litigation.   
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However, fast food settlements have occurred. For example, McDonald’s had to settle a 
suit due to it improperly disclosing its use of trans-fats.162 Essentially, McDonald’s said in 2002 
that it would switch to oil without trans-fats but did not actually implement the change until 
2003.163 This settlement shows that consumer protection suits are more likely to have positive 
results in fast food litigation, rather than personal injury suits related to health issues. Other plain-
tiffs have seen success with these types of consumer protection suits in the food industry, but their 
suits had nothing to do with resulting health issues like obesity, and were not part of a global 
agreement like the MSA.164  
The second sign of success is evidence of corporate wrongdoing. There is evidence that 
fast food causes health issues,165 yet based on the tobacco framework, that alone is not enough. To 
succeed, plaintiffs must have smoking gun documents showing unfair conduct by the corporation, 
which is not the case in fast food litigation. Part of the evidence used in the tobacco litigation was 
uncovered during the suit determining if the FDA could regulate tobacco.166 In 2009, the FDA 
began regulating the tobacco industry,167 whereas fast food was always under its control.168 That 
means fast food has one less route to obtain evidence of corporate wrongdoing because a similar 
investigation is unlikely to occur.  
The other important evidence indicating corporate wrongdoing and contributing to the to-
bacco litigation’s success was that cigarette manufacturers knew their products were carcinogenic 
since the 1950s, despite claiming they were not liable for harm caused to heavy smokers because 
the resulting lung cancer was unforeseeable.169 Scientific evidence also allowed plaintiffs to estab-
lish causation between Big Tobacco’s products and individual health issues.170 Unlike the tobacco 
cases, no smoking gun documents exist showing that Big Fast Food knew fast food causes obesity 
and other weight-related ailments or that it took measures to make fast food more addictive or 
targeted children.171 Additionally, the causation link is more tenuous between eating fast food and 
obesity-related health issues, as discussed in the previous Subsection.172    
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However, there is evidence that Big Fast Food is using similar tactics. Big Tobacco paid 
scientists to conduct studies to counteract other studies linking cancer to smoking and required the 
scientists to memorize a deceptive script stating that the carcinogenic effects of cigarettes were 
“not proven.”173 There is evidence that the food industry also pays scientists for similar jobs.174 
However, this is likely less impactful because of the diversity in the food industry. For example, 
there is evidence that the food industry paid scientists to counteract studies that soft drinks nega-
tively affect health, which is only one product sold by fast food restaurants.175 Both industries 
created grassroots-sounding entities, like The Center for Consumer Freedom for the food industry, 
to push their own agendas and discount other scientists.176 The lack of success in fast food litigation 
shows that evidence of these similar tactics alone is not dispositive. Instead, there needs to be proof 
of wrongful conduct by a corporation, like targeted child advertising, lying about knowledge of 
negative health effects, or purposefully making its products more addictive.177   
The third sign of success is a change in public opinion. While the tobacco litigation likely 
inspired a 30% decrease in overall smoking between 1954 and 2019,178 the fast food litigation 
made little to no impact. For example, projected fast food sales increased from $580 billion in 
2010 to $863 billion in 2019.179 Between 2013 and 2016, almost 40% of Americans “said they ate 
fast food in the past 24 hours.”180 Yet, another 2016 survey stated that 54% of Americans think 
the U.S. cares more about healthy eating than it did twenty years ago.181 An explanation for this 
discrepancy is that fast food restaurants have adapted their marketing to address modern concerns 
of eating healthy.182   
In 2004, one year after the 2003 Pelman case, McDonald’s removed the “super-size” op-
tion from its menu,183 “provided nutrition information on food packaging, and added healthier 
options such as salads and fruit to its menu.”184 In a sense, McDonald’s owned up to its previous 
actions and the legal allegations by making positive changes. The tobacco industry did something 
similar. In response to plummeting sales after the first harmful study was released, the cigarette 
corporations published “A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” in four hundred and forty-eight 
1954 newspapers, which “assured Americans that ‘we accept an interest in people’s health as a 
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basic responsibility.’”185 As of 1950 and onward, the tobacco companies released “healthier” al-
ternatives to the traditional cigarette: including low-tar, low-nicotine, and filtered cigarettes,186 and 
most recently vapes.187 Although marketed as safe alternatives, these were not any healthier and,188 
in the case of vapes189 and asbestos-riddled filtered cigarettes,190 were sometimes even more dan-
gerous than the original product. Similarly, new “health-foods” at fast food restaurants give con-
sumers a false narrative that they can eat these items as often as they want because they are 
healthy.191 In fact, studies in 1986, 1991, and 2016 found that fast food has become increasingly 
unhealthy, with calories, portion sizes, and sodium content all rising over time.192 Additionally, 
offering healthy options like salads backfired for the general McDonald’s consumer, who is often 
more concerned about spending the least money for the most calories.193 Salads do not fit this 
model because they are often the lowest calorie, yet most expensive item on the menu.194 There-
fore, these menu changes are not actually a successful result of the litigation because they do not 
help address the social issue of obesity, just like the changes tobacco companies made during the 
first and second litigation waves did not help resolve social harms.    
Allow this comparison between the tobacco and fast food litigation to illuminate the im-
portance of discovering evidence of corporate wrongdoing to succeed in litigation. False marketing 
increased the sales of filtered cigarettes from 2% in 1952 to over 60% of all cigarette sales by 
1966.195 But the “advertised benefits of filters were illusory, however, given that smokers of fil-
tered brands often inhaled as much or more tar, nicotine, and noxious gases as smokers of unfil-
tered cigarettes.”196 Later, plaintiffs used evidence that Big Tobacco recognized that filtered ciga-
rettes were an unhealthy alternative back in the 1930s to hold them accountable.197 For example, 
a 1995 plaintiff won $2 million in damages for developing asbestos-related cancer after smoking 
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cigarettes with asbestos-riddled filters that were advertised as safe.198 The healthy alternatives 
McDonald’s and other fast food chains are now marketing need to be coupled with similar evi-
dence of knowledge and wrongdoing by fast food companies to result in litigative success. 
The fourth sign of success is new courtroom avenues. Individual plaintiffs began to succeed 
in the third wave of the tobacco litigation once evidence illustrated that smoking was not a 
choice.199 Evidence included intentional child advertising and manufacturers purposely making 
their products more addictive.200 This evidence allowed plaintiffs to succeed under the “addiction-
as-injury” theory.201 Similarly, fast food outlets spend around $3 billion annually in television 
advertisements targeting children,202 and McDonald’s utilizes characters like Ronald McDonald 
and others, the equivalent to cigarette cartoons like Joe Camel.203 However, the difference is it is 
not illegal to sell fast food to children like it is tobacco, and food is a necessary source of nutri-
tion.204 Additionally, there are few studies confirming the addictive nature of fast food compared 
to nicotine.205 The Pelman judge denied this specific argument because the plaintiffs failed to es-
tablish if the food was addictive at all, and if the exposure as a child increased the alleged addictive 
nature.206  
The fifth sign of success is litigation encouraging legislation that helps address the social 
issue.207 Judges are less likely to adjudicate if the legislature has already adopted comprehensive 
programs and regulations to address the social issue.208 This seems to be the case with fast food 
litigation because there was a broad legislative and regulative response to the obesity epidemic.209 
Two particular legislative actions, Commonsense Consumption Bills (“CCBs”)210 and calorie 
count laws,211 responded to the social problem while limiting litigation. By 2018, the FDA required 
compliance from fast food chains meeting certain criteria (such as number of locations, etc.) to 
display accurate calorie counts so consumers may make informed decisions about their nutritional 
sources.212 The FDA also requires companies to list out the fat and sugar content of each item.213 
Unlike vague warning labels of tobacco products, consumers should be able to tell if McDonald’s 
new salad is truly healthy or not based on these data points. Because obesity is largely caused by 
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an excessive consumption of calories,214 these regulations combat dangerous elements of these 
food items.215 Although, like the Labeling Act, this would likely allow companies to lodge the free 
will defense because consumers assume the risk of eating fast food by knowing the calorie count. 
Therefore, this action limits litigation just as the Labeling Act did, while addressing the social 
issue of smoking, or obesity in the case of CCBs.   
Like the 1965 Labeling Act preempting certain causes of action against tobacco compa-
nies,216 twenty-six states banned bringing obesity lawsuits against fast food companies after Pel-
man and Barber via CCBs.217 The difference is that CCBs prevent future litigation and do not 
affect the outcome of Pelman and Barber. However, the 1965 Act was later reinterpreted to allow 
certain causes of action,218 while the fast food litigation bans are in full force.219 CCBs are a type 
of tort reform preventing lawsuits brought against “food manufacturers, packers, distributors, car-
riers, holders, sellers, marketers, and advertisers from civil actions” related to health issues sur-
rounding weight gain or obesity.220 However, the bills still allow suits for adulterated or mislabeled 
food and false advertising.221 This hurdle shifts the focus on the company’s conduct, just as was 
required in the tobacco suits. Therefore, if evidence was found showing that Big Fast Food pur-
posefully marketed at children or made its food more addictive, claimants could still sue in states 
with CCBs.  
The last sign of success is the ability to aggregate claims. Unlike tobacco, fast food litiga-
tion was able to certify class action suits.222 The lack of recovery in Pelman was based on the 
merits of the case, not the class itself,223 unlike the third wave’s Engle and Castano, where the 
class won on the merits but lost due to decertification.224 This comparison shows that certification 
alone does not indicate success. Instead, it is important to have some ability to aggregate claims to 
level the playing field with big companies, such as parens patriae standing did for the tobacco 
litigation.  
 
C. Conclusion and Additions to Framework 
 
In addition to the important elements of the tobacco litigation listed in the previous Sub-
section, analyzing fast food will complete the framework this Article is creating to analyze the 
potential success of the opioid and climate change litigation. First, an attenuated causation link 
will prevent attorneys general from negotiating a global settlement agreement like the MSA. Sec-
ond, evidence showing corporate wrongful conduct is required for individual plaintiffs to succeed 
and persuade judges to allow new litigation avenues. However, evidence of a company employing 
its own researcher or employing similar Big Tobacco media tactics is not dispositive. Third, liti-
gation may inspire deceptive marketing strategies promoting unhealthy products as healthy. In this 
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way, litigation makes societal issues worse rather than better. Fourth, if legislation is more perva-
sive, it is less likely that litigation will succeed. The fast food and tobacco litigations are almost 
mirror images of each other. The tobacco litigation began with the Labeling Act preempting claims 
while the fast food litigation ended with legislation preempting obesity-related claims. Similarly, 
the FDA was already regulating fast food during the obesity litigation, whereas the FDA did not 
regulate tobacco until almost twenty years after the MSA. The requirement to list calories is similar 
to the Labeling Act because it shifts the burden of preventing obesity from the fast food companies 
to consumers. Last, class certification alone is not dispositive if the claimants cannot win on the 
merits.    
 
IV. OPIOID LITIGATION 
 
This Part analyzes three elements of the opioid litigation that distinguishes it from the to-
bacco litigation: it has one of the most complex Multi-District Litigations,225 it includes the first-
ever negotiation class,226 and a state public nuisance claim returned a positive judgment for plain-
tiffs.227 Analyzing these unique factors and applying the tobacco framework shows that the opioid 
litigation has the potential to succeed under the tobacco model because litigants are adapting the 
tobacco framework to solve the opioid crisis.  
 
A. Summary of the Litigation 
 
The opioid litigation has proceeded in a similar fashion to the tobacco litigation, although 
along a faster timeline. The crisis’s origins trace back to the 1980s, when the U.S. began looking 
for effective methods to manage pain.228 Originally a drug exclusive to cancer treatment and short-
term use, opioids became extremely popular in the mid-1990s when opioid-based medications, 
like Purdue Pharma’s OxyContin, flooded the market promising efficacy and low potential for 
addiction.229 However, it eventually came to light that opioids did not effectively treat long-term 
chronic pain.230 In fact, “with long-term use, people can develop tolerance to the drugs and even 
become more sensitive to pain.”231 The claims of low addiction rates were also untrue.232 The FDA 
sent a warning letter to Purdue Pharma in 2003, stating “that its advertisements ‘grossly over-
state[d] the safety profile’” in regard to addiction.233 In 2007, Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty to 
felony charges for “misbranding” OxyContin by marketing the drug as non-addictive when it knew 
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it was being abused.234 The DOJ determined that Purdue Pharma knew people were abusing Oxy-
Contin because the company received disturbing reports of the drug being snorted and stolen, and 
that doctors sold prescriptions.235 There were also emails between Purdue employees discussing 
the drug’s “credibility problem” after receiving these reports.236 The DOJ felt obligated to settle 
with the pharma powerhouse on the charges for $634.5 million in penalties due to the company’s 
large resources, despite originally charging the company and three Purdue executives with felony 
and misdemeanor charges that included jail time.237 The settlement agreement also required inde-
pendent monitoring of Purdue’s practices238 and resulted in Purdue redeveloping OxyContin’s for-
mula to “make it more difficult to crush and inhale.”239 This reduced abuse,240 and OxyContin 
manufacturers began marketing its products overseas, as America was a dying market.241 Two 
opioid distributors, McKesson and Cardinal Health, settled for close to $50 million collectively in 
2008 after the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) accused them of failing to report suspicious 
sales of opioids from “rogue [i]nternet pharmac[ies].”242 In 2013, the DEA put a two-year suspen-
sion on Cardinal Health’s ability to distribute highly-addictive narcotics due to lack of oversight.243 
Despite these cases showing evidence of corporate wrongdoing, which helped kick off the 
success of the tobacco litigation, 12.6 billion opioid-based pills were produced and distributed in 
the United States in 2012.244 Additionally, the individual suits during the 2000s were dismissed 
either because of intervening or superseding causation issues or the assumption of the risk de-
fense.245 The opioid addiction crisis has considerably worsened over the past three to four years.246 
In 2012, about 19,000 people died of opioid overdoses, whereas the number increased to 47,600 
in 2017.247 The spike in deaths influenced the federal government to establish the “Commission 
on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis,” and the opioid crisis was declared a national 
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emergency in August 2017.248 In September 2017, forty-one attorneys general banded together to 
investigate Big Pharma’s opioid production, marketing, and distribution practices.249 
The DOJ and DEA enforced penalties on several Big Pharma corporations in 2017 and 
2018. In July 2017, one of the largest generic oxycodone manufacturers, Mallinckrodt, settled with 
the federal government for $35 million for allegations of failing to notify the DEA of suspicious 
orders and for giving “distributors ‘an increasingly excessive quantity of oxycodone pills’ between 
2008 and 2011.”250 CVS paid the DOJ over $5 million in three different settlements regarding 
allegations of keeping improper records in California and Alabama pharmacies that could have 
prevented the theft of thousands of hydrocodone doses, as well as for failing to report thefts from 
New York pharmacies.251 McKesson then settled for a record-breaking $150 million in civil pen-
alties with the DOJ for violating the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) by failing to stop suspi-
cious orders, similar to its 2008 settlement.252 However, the monetary penalty was almost eight 
times more than the 2008 settlement, and the 2017 settlement required “McKesson to suspend 
sales of controlled substances from distribution centers in Colorado, Ohio, Michigan and Florida 
for multiple years.”253 The DOJ explained that the “staged suspensions are among the most severe 
sanctions” the DEA has ever enforced on a registered distributor.254 Last, Cardinal Health also 
settled again in 2017 for failure to maintain adequate records tracking drug movements and the 
failure to report suspicious orders.255    
While these settlements show the federal government acknowledged Big Pharma’s wrong-
doing, Big Pharma paid the civil penalties to the government, rather than to the citizens in need.256 
Additionally, repeat offenses involving the same actions by the same actors show that these settle-
ments are not properly curbing Big Pharma’s wrong deeds or even hurting its business. Last, sev-
eral of the claims in the previous paragraph occurred up to six years before the settlement,257 while 
the opioid epidemic requires a quick solution because during 2016 and 2017 around 130 Ameri-
cans died every day from opioid overdoses.258 Citizens seemed unsatisfied with the federal gov-
ernment’s approach, as 2,700 lawsuits brought by states, local governments, and tribes are now 
pending in the federal MDL set in Cleveland, Ohio.259   
The opioid MDL is the first unique element to the opioid litigation. An MDL is a pre-trial 
proceeding allowing one judge to consider pre-trial motions and discovery of multiple cases filed 
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in different courts.260 While an MDL is technically a pre-trial proceeding, about 75% of MDLs are 
resolved before being remanded to the original trial court.261 For example, plaintiffs utilized an 
MDL to successfully settle harms arising from the 2010 British Petroleum oil spill for four hundred 
local governments and five gulf states.262 MDLs are also a fantastic environment for encouraging 
settlement because the judge is expected to work with the parties in finding a resolution.263 That is 
particularly true of the opioid MDL, as presiding Judge Polster “has made it very clear that settle-
ment is the ultimate goal of the opioid MDL.”264 He “inform[ed] lawyers that he intended to dis-
pense with legal norms like discovery” and “order[ed] counsel to launch into settlement discus-
sions immediately.”265 In fact, he was pushing so much for a global settlement that the MDL de-
fendants filed a brief requesting the removal of Judge Polster due to bias.266 Judge Polster predict-
ably denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit agreed, stating that he was encouraging settlement 
because it is the most expedient solution to the epidemic, not out of bias.267 The opioid MDL is 
also not Judge Polster’s first experience with consolidated cases, as he was appointed to the opioid 
MDL because of his previous involvement with “damage claims related to dyes used in magnetic 
resonance imaging procedures.”268 Cleveland, Ohio, was chosen as the location for the MDL due 
to the state’s familiarity with overdose deaths, as 4,050 Ohioans died of overdoses in 2016.269 For 
comparison, opioid overdoses killed 4,653 Oklahomans from 2007 to 2017.270 Cleveland is also 
close to various defendant “drugmakers’ headquarters in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, which is home to drug distributor Cardinal Health.”271  
Second, the opioid litigation certified the first-ever negotiation class. A negotiation class 
encourages settlement by binding the plaintiffs to a settlement structure before the negotiation 
begins.272 The procedure contains four steps:273 the first being the class certification already com-
pleted by Judge Polster.274 The class in the opioid case “seeks to unite the nation’s more than 
30,000 cities and counties into one group that would seek global deals with drug manufacturers 
and distributors,” not just the local governments that already filed suits in the MDL.275 Forty-nine 
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class representatives from various U.S. cities and counties will negotiate on behalf of the entire 
class.276 The second step is sending notices to all the class members, allowing them to opt out by 
a certain date.277 If a class member takes no action he or she is automatically opted-in.278 Judge 
Polster set the opt-out deadline as November 22, 2019; with only 500 cities opting out, 98% of the 
class remains.279 Deborah Hensler commented that the lack of opt-outs suggests the class members 
think the negotiation class is the best solution to the opioid epidemic.280  Third, once a settlement 
is reached, class members vote for or against the result.281 Fourth, if 75% of class members vote 
supporting the proposed settlement, class counsel then asks the court to approve it.282  
Judge Polster limited the claims and defendants subject to the negotiation class.283 RICO 
claims may be brought against the “Opioid Marketing Enterprise” (“Purdue, Cephalon, Janssen, 
Endo, and Mallinckrodt”), and “the alleged Opioid Supply Chain Enterprise (Purdue, Cephalon, 
Endo, Mallinckrodt, Actavis, McKesson, Cardinal, and AmerisourceBergen).”284 CSA claims may 
be brought against thirteen sets of distribution defendants “(Purdue, Cephalon, Endo, Mallinck-
rodt, Actavis, Janssen, McKesson, Cardinal, AmerisourceBergen, CVS Rx Services, Inc., Rite-
Aid Corporation, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart).”285 These claims seem like a direct callback to the 
DEA and DOJ settlements, except the negotiation class settlement will send money directly to 
local governments in need and will hold several defendants accountable at once.286 However, being 
a class member prevents local governments from seeking their own settlements.287 Once a class 
member reaches a personalized settlement with one of the class defendants, it just means it cannot 
recoup costs from that same defendant if a negotiation class reaches a settlement.288 The class will 
terminate five years from November 2019 if no major settlement talks are in progress.289  
Third, an Oklahoma state court returned a judgment awarding $465 million to plaintiffs for 
Johnson & Johnson’s participation in the opioid crisis.290 This positive precedent is unique to the 
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opioid litigation because the tobacco public nuisance claims settled before they could reach 
court.291 The impending litigation motivated Teva and Purdue Pharma to settle with Oklahoma for 
$85 million and $270 million, respectively, making Johnson & Johnson the only remaining de-
fendant.292 In a bench trial, Judge Balkman ruled that as the number one narcotics supplier of raw 
materials in the world’s largest opioid market (the U.S.), Johnson & Johnson downplayed the ad-
dictive risk of prescription opioids.293 One example of its false and misleading marketing included 
“trumpet[ing] the concept of ‘pseudoaddiction’ to persuade doctors that patients who appeared 
hooked on opioids actually should be given more opioids for under-treated pain.”294 Judge Balk-
man determined that the false marketing created a public nuisance, a theory typically reserved for 
real and personal property.295 He theorized that public nuisance is not limited to property-related 
nuisances, and even if it was, “there [was] sufficient evidence that [Johnson & Johnson] ‘perva-
sively, systemically and substantially used real and personal property’” to create a nuisance.296 
Plaintiffs sought close to $17 billion, estimating it would take twenty years of treatment to solve 
the Oklahoma opioid epidemic.297 Judge Balkman was not convinced and only found Johnson & 
Johnson liable for a year of treatment costs.298 Johnson & Johnson is appealing based on an im-
proper interpretation of public nuisance law,299 while plaintiffs are appealing hoping to receive 
more than one year’s damages.300 These appeals are preventing Johnson & Johnson from paying 
the damages into Oklahoma’s state abatement fund.301 Unlike the MDL and the negotiation class, 
this suit follows the tobacco model, as it was brought by the Oklahoma Attorney General under a 
state public nuisance claim.302     
 
B. Applying the Framework 
 
The first sign of success from the tobacco litigation framework is the potential for large 
settlements. The opioid litigation has several factors indicating that it will result in a global settle-
ment like the MSA, albeit the path to reach a settlement is less clear. Attorneys general have al-
ready established parens patriae standing by filing suits against Big Pharma companies as early 
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as 2015.303 The first settlement took place in 2015 between Kentucky and Purdue for $24 mil-
lion.304 The suit was based on fraudulent misrepresentation because Purdue downplayed the ad-
dictive nature of OxyContin, and the economic harm caused by Purdue and other actors, which 
totaled over $70 billion in 2013, was felt all over the United States.305 A newer estimate is that it 
will cost over $480 million to fix the national opioid crisis,306 while the financial effects felt since 
2001 are estimated at $50 billion to $1 trillion, considering “the costs of health care, criminal 
justice, lost productivity and addiction treatment programs.”307 While, unlike the fast food litiga-
tion, the causation link between the financial harms and the actions of Big Pharma is strong enough 
to inspire forty-eight attorneys general to bring lawsuits, the states have not accomplished a global 
settlement like the MSA.308 The recent success of a public nuisance claim in an Oklahoma state 
court against Johnson & Johnson, and Teva and Purdue’s decision to settle shortly before the trial, 
will likely influence more Big Pharma companies to settle with states.309 The trial also preceded a 
2020 settlement of $8.8 million between pharmaceutical marketing company Endo and Okla-
homa.310 However, public nuisance law analysis differs state to state and a judge rejected the public 
nuisance claim brought by North Dakota’s Attorney General earlier in 2019, despite Oklahoma 
and North Dakota having similar public nuisance laws.311 These varying results make it more likely 
that Big Pharma will want to go to trial.  
Running parallel to the state public nuisance claims is Judge Polster’s MDL. The first set-
tlement arising out of the MDL occurred in 2019 when opioid manufacturer Teva and distributors 
McKesson, Cardinal Health, and AmerisourceBergen paid two Ohio counties $260 million in to-
tal.312 The settlement transpired at the eleventh hour before the MDL’s first bellwether trial.313 
Bellwether trials are an optional settlement tool engaged by MDL judges; they are “test cases” to 
see how the juries react to plaintiffs’ claims and serve as crucial building blocks to negotiate global 
settlements.314 Therefore, the first bellwether trial did not serve its purpose because it did not go 
to a jury and only resulted in a settlement with two counties.315 Meanwhile, cities, counties, states, 
and Native American tribes are all clamoring to negotiate their own settlement agreement in the 
MDL.316 This environment is making a global settlement agreement like the MSA less likely. One 
key difference between the tobacco and opioid crises is that opioids are creating an emergency in 
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which 150 Americans die every day.317 Perhaps plaintiffs feel they must act quickly and do not 
have time to wait for the resolution Judge Polster promised to fashion in 2018.318 And because 
most settlement agreements come with the promise not to litigate again,319 there may not be a way 
to reach a global agreement once other local governments have settled. Additionally, once local 
governments agree to individual settlements, they have less incentive to participate in the negoti-
ation class. The tobacco litigation went through a similar hiccup in that the first global settlement 
in 1997 was not adopted and some states settled prior to the MSA.320 However, the opioid litigation 
is much more complex as there are more plaintiffs, defendants, and three competing means to 
achieving settlements (the state attorneys general claims, the MDL, and the negotiation class).   
The negotiation class brings up additional divisions between attorneys general and local 
governments. Following Judge Polster’s class certification, drug distribution defendants and six 
Ohio cities filed briefs in the Sixth Circuit requesting the class be decertified because it violated 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.321 A dozen attorneys general and Washington, 
D.C., wrote an amicus brief supporting the appeal, arguing that states, not cities, should be suing 
on behalf of citizens.322 All parties supporting the appeal feel that because states are suing the same 
companies in different actions, local governments should not have the sole negotiating power.323 
Defendants seem willing to work with attorneys general, as four attorneys general were able to 
convince AmerisourceBergen, McKesson, and Cardinal Health to settle for $18 billion in 2020 
with the MDL plaintiffs, but both MDL attorneys and twenty attorneys general expressed opposi-
tion.324 Recently, an ongoing $48 billion settlement discussion between attorneys general and five 
opioid manufacturers was jeopardized when MDL attorneys requested a 7% commission, amount-
ing to $3.3 billion.325 Defendants and thirty-six state attorneys general contacted Judge Polster, 
stating that these fees would severely endanger the possibility of a global settlement, as 7% would 
allow the private attorneys to receive more money than the states they are representing.326     
However, Judge Polster’s negotiation class is an adaptation and improvement on the to-
bacco model. One criticism of the tobacco MSA is that states misuse the settlement funds.327 Be-
cause all of the MDL opioid plaintiffs are local governments or even American Indian nations,328 
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they are likely suing individually to ensure the funds go directly to their opioid treatment programs. 
While this is much more complex and will take more time than attorneys general negotiating for 
the MSA, the litigation is adapting the tobacco model to fit its needs. The ultimate success in 
resolving a social policy tort is resolving the social issue, and if local governments receiving their 
own settlements to address the issue locally will better help end the opioid epidemic, that is the 
ideal settlement plan.     
 Ohio recently showed that hundreds of local governments, state governors, and attorneys 
general can work together on opioid settlements.329 An agreement called “One Ohio” states that 
the Ohio Attorney General would conduct all the negotiations while guaranteeing a 30% cash pay-
out to all cities that sign the agreement by March 6th, 2020.330 The state would receive 15% of the 
funds and the remaining 55% would go toward opioid research and education.331 Although adopt-
ing this framework nationally is unlikely to lead to a global settlement, it shows how local com-
munities and attorneys general can work together.    
 Despite a lack of a united front, there are two tentative settlement agreements. First, there 
is a tentative MDL settlement of $1.6 billion involving generic opioid producer Mallinckrodt 
backed by forty-seven attorneys general that would also resolve the thousands of lawsuits involv-
ing Mallinckrodt in the MDL.332 The tentative settlement agreement would require the American 
subsidiary of Mallinckrodt, which produces generic opioids, to undergo Chapter 11 bankruptcy.333 
Once a “bankruptcy judge approves its restructuring plan, an initial payment of $300 million would 
be disbursed to plaintiffs to alleviate the opioid crisis, with the remaining $1.3 billion to be paid 
out over eight years.”334  
Second, McKinsey & Co., a consulting firm to Purdue, recently settled with forty-seven 
attorneys general, Washington, D.C., and five U.S. territories for nearly $600 million.335 The set-
tlement occurred because a lawsuit uncovered documents showing McKinsey created sales tactics 
to increase sales of OxyContin and suggested methods to avoid strict regulation from the FDA.336 
This settlement shows how complex the opioid litigation is because not only are producers of 
opioids like Mallinckrodt culpable, but their consulting firms and even pharmacies selling opioids 
are as well.337 Although this settlement and Mallinckrodt’s settlement are only with a single de-
fendant, the agreements are the closest thing to a global settlement that the opioid litigation has 
produced.   
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Purdue is also using bankruptcy as a sort of settlement agreement.338 This process works 
by companies filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in which the potential litigants become the credi-
tors, requiring a bankruptcy judge to reorganize the companies’ assets to pay off the plaintiffs’ 
damages.339 Recently, a New York bankruptcy judge allowed Purdue to use approximately $24 
million to create an “ad blitz” that will encourage individual plaintiffs to file their opioid claims 
against Purdue by June 30, 2020.340 As Purdue pours more money into individual claims, that 
could weaken the possibility of a global settlement.341 The bankruptcy judge also approved an $8.3 
billion settlement between Purdue and the DOJ, requiring Purdue to plead guilty to three felo-
nies.342 This could be a step toward a global settlement as Purdue often stated it would not settle 
with states until the federal claims were resolved.343 
The second sign of success is evidence of corporate wrongdoing. Like the tobacco litiga-
tion, smoking gun documents have been uncovered in the opioid litigation to show wrongdoing by 
Big Pharma, and there also multiple avenues to gain access to internal documents. In the thousands 
of consolidated cases before Judge Polster, he granted access to market share data after attorneys 
pressed for the information.344 Additionally, a few companies have gone into bankruptcy proceed-
ings, most notably Purdue Pharma, allowing attorneys general access to thousands of internal doc-
uments.345 There may be more evidence to come as the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to re-
view Kentucky’s 2015 settlement with Purdue in August 2019, removing the seal on 17 million 
pages of documents.346     
Evidence of wrongdoing has cleared up causation issues. The causation line is less tenuous 
than the fast food litigation, but not as clear as the tobacco litigation. One reason the causation line 
is less clear is because more actors are responsible for the drugs reaching consumers, such as doc-
tors prescribing the medicine, pharmacists filling the prescriptions, and insurance companies en-
couraging pain medicine when other treatments were available.347 Big Pharma could argue that it 
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is not to blame, as some industry experts criticize doctors overprescribing opioids and the DEA’s 
confusing laws and lack of enforcement for the opioid epidemic.348 However, Big Pharma may be 
more blameworthy as the evidence from the Oklahoma trial showed Johnson & Johnson funded 
and participated “in allegedly sham groups like the American Pain Society and others, which 
worked doggedly to legitimize opioids.”349 Additionally, there is evidence that distributors, like 
McKesson and Cardinal Health, played a large part in enacting a law that prevented the DEA from 
freezing narcotics shipments.350 Additionally, Big Pharma may be more blameworthy because it 
acted intentionally while feeding its lies to doctors and insurance companies, who likely only acted 
negligently. Judge Polster seems to think Big Pharma is most responsible, as the only defendants 
subject to the negotiation class are opioid manufacturers, marketers, and distributors.351 
Big Pharma acted similarly to Big Tobacco, considering the evidence of Purdue and John-
son & Johnson marketing the opioids as non-addictive when they knew they were addictive. Ad-
ditionally, Johnson & Johnson claiming “pseudoaddiction” to influence doctors to prescribe opi-
oids to already addicted patients seems remarkably similar to Big Tobacco purposely making its 
product more addictive. Last, Purdue’s attempt to reduce people abusing its pills had an insignifi-
cant effect on the epidemic, similar to Big Tobacco attempting to make “healthier” cigarettes. 
The third sign of success is a change in public opinion. It is hard to gauge how the opioid 
litigation has changed the public since these claims have yet to be seen before a jury.352 Individual 
plaintiffs still feel that there is a stigma surrounding opioid addiction and that the public still blames 
individuals, not Big Pharma, for addiction.353 In 2016, a Harvard poll assigned the following actors 
blame for the opioid epidemic: 37% users, 34% doctors, 10% pharmaceutical companies, and 7% 
the FDA.354 This stigma is hard to shake, as 44% of Americans polled by the Associated Press in 
2018 believed opioid addiction indicated a lack of willpower.355 It is interesting how the results 
from this poll differ from the defendants chosen for Judge Polster’s negotiation class: drug mar-
keters, manufacturers, and distributors. The lack of understanding regarding opioid addiction 
makes global settlements even more important because juries might find individual plaintiffs “as-
sumed the risk,” as they did during the tobacco litigation.356 However, the litigation has success-
fully increased overall awareness of the epidemic. Another 2018 Associated Press poll reported 
that 43% of those polled said the use of opioids is a serious problem in their community, a 10% 
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increase from the 2016 poll.357 It also shows the need for treatment programs because two-thirds 
of those polled stated their local government is not doing enough.358      
The fourth sign of success is new courtroom avenues. Opioid claims have been adjudicated 
with positive results in front of an Oklahoma state judge, making this element stronger than both 
the fast food and tobacco cases. While it is helpful that a state court affirmed a public nuisance 
claim, it is worrisome that so many states are pursuing their own litigation rather than seeking a 
settlement. There are also new additions to the tobacco model mentioned earlier: MDL and the 
negotiation class. 
The fifth sign of success is creating a body of legislation. Judge Polster has stated, “[c]an-
didly, the other branches of government, federal and state, have punted.”359 Polster also indicated 
that he plans to take a legislative rather than a litigative approach in these cases.360 By this, he 
means that instead of ruling on the legal theories, he hopes to implement new systems and new 
treatments for those addicted.361 The Purdue bankruptcy terms show potential for this type of ap-
proach, as one condition requires Purdue to provide “states and local communities, at no or low 
cost, life-saving opioid overdose reversal medications such as nalmefene and naloxone.”362 It also 
promised to continue developing these types of drugs through a new company and agreed to “be 
bound permanently by injunctive relief, including marketing restrictions on the sale and promotion 
of opioids.”363 The marketing restrictions sound similar to the marketing limitations the MSA 
placed on Big Tobacco. However, if the settlements continue in a piecemeal nature, either com-
prising a single defendant, a single state, or both, they are less likely to have legislative compo-
nents. This is because the local cities suing likely care more about abatement and less about policy.       
The sixth sign of success is the ability to aggregate claims. The opioid litigation may ex-
ceed the tobacco litigation under this sign of success because the litigation has spawned three 
methods to aggregate claims: the MDL, the negotiation class, and attorneys general suing on behalf 




The opioid litigation shows all six signs of success present in the tobacco litigation frame-
work. First, there are multiple pathways for the litigation to end in a global settlement: Judge Pol-
ster’s settlement-focused MDL, the negotiation class consisting of 98% of America’s cities, or the 
attorneys general tobacco model. These methods are working against one another as attorneys 
general attempt to work with local governments, but the Ohioan model shows promise. While there 
have been some settlements between defendants and single states, the most promising development 
is the recent tentative settlement between Mallinckrodt, the MDL plaintiffs, and forty-seven attor-
neys general. Additionally, the finalized settlement with consulting firm McKinsey, forty-seven 
attorneys general, D.C., and five U.S. territories also shows that non-producing actors are culpable. 
While these are not as global as the MSA because each only includes one defendant, a piecemeal 
 
357 ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC, supra note 355, at 2.  
358 Id. at 5. 
359 McCollum, supra note 225, at 944. 
360 Richards, supra note 245, at 444. 
361 Id.  
362 Purdue Pharma Announces Agreement in Principle on Landmark Opioid Litigation Settlement, PURDUE (Sept. 
16, 2019), https://www.purduepharma.com/news/2019/09/16/purdue-pharma-announces-agreement-in-principle-on-
landmark-opioid-litigation-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/9NMG-G6Y2]. 
363 Id.  
Volume 8 The Opioid Crisis or Climate Change 2021 
 
 58 
approach may be the solution to the complex opioid epidemic. This epidemic differs from the 
tobacco crisis because it has multiple defendants in the form of marketers, manufacturers, and 
distributors, who all likely have a different level of culpability. Another strong avenue for global 
settlements unique to the opioid litigation is utilizing Chapter 11 bankruptcy to distribute assets to 
plaintiffs.   
Second, there is evidence of wrongdoing by Big Pharma similar to that of Big Tobacco. 
The evidence helped show that drug marketers, manufacturers, and distributors are more blame-
worthy than doctors or the government in the opioid epidemic. This evidence resulted in Purdue 
pleading guilty to misstatements in 2007, several DEA and DOJ settlements in 2017, an Oklahoma 
state court finding Johnson & Johnson used misleading marketing in 2019, and Judge Polster mak-
ing the defendants of the negotiation class solely drug marketers, manufacturers, and distributors. 
Third, it is evident that public opinion has not changed regarding opioid addicts’ blameworthiness, 
but polls do show an increased awareness of the opioid epidemic. Fourth, the new courtroom ave-
nues of the opioid litigation are the MDL, the negotiation class, and the positive precedent set in 
the Oklahoma court. Fifth, Judge Polster wants to use legislative remedies to solve the crisis, but 
all the settlements so far have been monetary. The only exception is Purdue’s bankruptcy proceed-
ing requiring the distribution of overdose reversal medications. A global settlement negotiated by 
attorneys general is more likely to have policy components like the MSA did. Last, the ability to 
aggregate claims is even stronger here than it was in the tobacco litigation. There are now three 
methods: the MDL, the negotiation class, and attorneys general suing on behalf of citizens.    
The opioid litigation is likely to see success under an adapted tobacco model. It differs 
from the tobacco model in complexity, but that is mitigated by unique elements like the MDL and 
the negotiation class. It also improves upon the tobacco model because the local governments 
bringing suits are able to ensure the settlement money goes to treatment. While the three pathways 
to a global settlement conflict, Ohio’s agreement between cities and the state shows cooperation 
is possible. The opioid litigation may not resolve with an agreement identical to the MSA, but the 
recent Mallinckrodt settlement suggests that the litigation may be resolved in a piecemeal fash-
ion—either with single defendants or groups of defendants working in the same sector (i.e., distri-
bution v. marketing) and several plaintiffs or single local governments. Either way, Big Pharma 
has paid and will pay more for its contribution to the opioid epidemic.   
   
V. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
 
 “[T]here’s one issue that will define the contours of this century more dramatically than 
any other . . . the urgent and growing threat of a changing climate,” Barack Obama commented 
during the 2014 United Nations Climate Change Summit.364 Obama was correct, as climate change 








364 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the U.N. Climate Change Summit (Sept. 23, 2014) (transcript available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/remarks-president-un-climate-change-summit) 
[https://perma.cc/P65P-DFZX]. 
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A. Climate Change Suits Against the Government 
 
In 2019, 67% of Americans believed that the federal government was not doing enough to 
combat global climate change.365 This shared belief is reasonable considering the inaction taken 
by Congress in the last thirty years, with the last major congressional accomplishment being the 
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).366 Since then, partisan conflicts have prevented 
the enactment of meaningful environmental legislation,367 and resulted in the executive branch 
reversing or weakening environmental strides made by previous administrations.368 Notably, the 
United States was the only country to reject and withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Agree-
ment.369 The lack of beneficial governmental action and political contentions create the perfect 
backdrop to pursue a solution to climate change in the social policy tort framework.370 Due to 
climate change being a highly politicized issue, it makes sense to seek a solution in federal court 
because the judicial branch has the constitutional authority to check the political power of the other 
branches and make unpopular decisions.371   
The Supreme Court first recognized climate change in Massachusetts v. EPA,372 a 2007 
case brought by “[s]tates, local governments, and private organizations” to stop the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) from abdicating its duty under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions.373 In a 5–4 decision, the Court determined the plaintiffs had Article III standing: (1) the 
effect of rising sea levels “already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts,” (2) there was 
a causal link between the vehicle emissions the EPA was required to control and the harm of rising 
sea levels, and (3) while the EPA regulating emissions will not completely stop the harm of “global 
warming,” it could reduce the risks.374 The holding did not require the EPA to regulate vehicle 
emissions under the CAA, but interpreted the statute in such a way that left little deference.375 
 
365 Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climate-and-energy/ [https://perma.cc/5N8Q-
F4SD]. 
366 Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can Two 
Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENV’T L. 1139, 1148 (2015). 
367 See id.; see Nathaniel Levy, Juliana and the Political Generativity of Climate Litigation, 43 HARV. ENV’T. L. 
REV. 479, 479–80 (2019); Matthew Schneider, Where Juliana Went Wrong: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Climate Change Adaptation at the State Level, ENVIRONS ENV’T. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 48 (2017); see Mary Haley 
Ousley, Note, Precedent, Politics, or Priorities: Are Courts Stepping Out of Their Traditional Judicial Bounds When 
Addressing Climate Change?, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T. L.J. 349, 370–71 (2019).  
368 Ousley, supra note 367, at 355 (noting that the Trump administration, namely Administrator Scott Pruitt of 
the Environmental Protection Agency, weakened or reversed climate change regulations through budget cuts, lower 
environmental standards, urging the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, and opposing the Clean Power 
Plan). However, the Biden administration recently rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement. Josh Lederman, U.S. Rejoins 
Paris Climate Agreement. Now Comes the Daunting Part., NBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2021, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/u-s-rejoins-paris-climate-agreement-now-comes-daunting-part-
n1258304 [https://perma.cc/34BR-SDPE].   
369 Id.  
370 See generally Barnes, supra note 5.  
371 Eric Hamilton, Politicizing the Supreme Court, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 39 (Aug. 2012); see Ousley, 
supra note 367, at 367–68, 371.  
372 Ousley, supra note 367, at 357; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
373 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505.  
374 Id. at 521–26 (explaining how the plaintiffs met the standards of injury, causation, and redressability of Article 
III standing).  
375 See Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 53, 59–61 (2007).   
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First, the Court determined greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” under the CAA.376 Second, the 
Court severely limited the EPA’s viable explanations for not regulating vehicle emissions,377 de-
termining that the EPA’s “laundry list” of policy reasons not to regulate was arbitrary and capri-
cious.378 Instead, a proper explanation should be rooted in science.379  
Massachusetts carves a path toward a successful social policy tort litigation in a few ways. 
First, it achieved the social policy tort goal of inspiring legislation. After the decision, the EPA 
began regulating pollution from “tailpipes, smokestacks, and oil and gas development activi-
ties.”380 Second, it also inspired the EPA to release a scientific study in 2009 analyzing the harmful 
effects of carbon dioxide and five other air pollutants.381 The study concluded that pollutants may 
“reasonably be anticipated to endanger health and to endanger public welfare.”382 The EPA’s and 
the Court’s recognition of a scientific causal link between fossil fuel emissions and harm helps 
establish the scientific causation element from the tobacco litigation. Third, it recognized Article 
III standing for climate change litigants,383 setting positive precedent for future lawsuits like the 
Oklahoma public nuisance claim did in the opioid litigation. 
However, the significance of Massachusetts is limited because it shows that the Court can 
encourage agencies to regulate under already enacted statutes, but does not ensure the Court can 
provide its own relief to parties harmed by climate change.384 The Massachusetts holding allows 
politically swayed agencies deference, as shown by the former EPA administrator Scott Pruitt 
publicly doubting if the EPA has the tools under the CAA to address climate change.385 Recently, 
twenty-one young plaintiffs claimed a right to a stable atmosphere under the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause and the public trust doctrine in Juliana v. United States.386 The Juliana plain-
tiffs are seeking “declaratory relief and an injunction ordering the government to implement a plan 
to ‘phase out fossil fuel emissions’” and begin carbon dioxide draw down.387 Meaning they are 
asking the judicial branch to expand the Massachusetts holding from encouraging to requiring 
legislation.  
Juliana “is no ordinary lawsuit.”388 It sues the President and eleven federal agencies for 
policy choices on a vast amount of topics resulting in a host of harms.389 In 2016, Juliana survived 
a motion to dismiss in an Oregon federal district court.390 The government then appealed and won 
in the Ninth Circuit.391 The suit was dismissed based on the third element of standing: the court 
 
376 Id.  
377 Id.  
378 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 501.  
379 See id.  
380 Ben Levitan, The Tenth Anniversary of Massachusetts v. EPA, ENV’T DEF. FUND (Apr. 2, 2017), 
http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2017/04/02/the-tenth-anniversary-of-massachusetts-v-epa/ [https://perma.cc/QBK5-
9TYP] (mentioning Clean Cars, Clean Trucks, Clean Power Plan, and methane pollution standards).  
381 Id.  
382 Id.  
383 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–26. 
384 See Lazarus, supra note 366, at 1152, 1154.  
385 Levitan, supra note 380.  
386 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2020).  
387 Id. at 1165.   
388 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th 
Cir. 2020).  
389 Id.  
390 Id.  
391 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175. 
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felt it was unable to redress the harm.392 While this Article focuses on lawsuits against private 
actors, and this lawsuit does not have a positive holding, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion could affect 
all climate change suits. First, the court determined that the government has long known about 
“the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.”393 The court based its con-
clusion on the facts that the government issued reports warning about the effects of climate change 
as early as 1965 and the government actively promoted fossil fuel usage through “beneficial tax 
provisions, permits for imports and exports, subsidies for domestic and overseas projects, and 
leases for fuel extraction on federal land.”394   
Second, the court stated that “climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace.”395 
The court relied on the plaintiffs’ expert evidence showing that: the years with the hottest recorded 
temperatures occurred in the last decade, with the average temperature increasing each year since 
1997; temperatures are already .09 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures, and the ex-
treme heat is melting polar ice caps.396 These facts led the court to conclude, “[a]bsent some action, 
the destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life-threatening natural disasters, and jeopardize 
critical food and water supplies.”397   
Third, the court addressed what types of harms may survive summary judgement under 
Article III standing.398 It determined that having to evacuate homes due to flooding and water 
scarcity were concrete and particularized injuries, similar to the rising sea levels harming plaintiffs 
in Massachusetts.399 Fourth, the court determined the causal chain between the harm and the gov-
ernment’s actions was sufficiently established for the purposes of summary judgment.400 The court 
connected the “plaintiffs’ alleged injuries . . . caused by carbon emissions from fossil fuel produc-
tion, extraction, and transportation” with “a significant portion of those emissions occur[ing] in” 
America.401 Additionally, the court reasoned that the federal government actively encouraged fos-
sil fuel usage because about “25% of fossil fuels extracted in the United States come from federal 
waters and lands, an activity that requires authorization from the federal government.”402 The court 
distinguished Juliana from a 2013 Ninth Circuit case where the plaintiffs sued for harms resulting 
from “local agencies’ failure to regulate five oil refineries.”403 The 2013 plaintiffs’ standing was 
insufficient because they blamed isolated agency decisions for their injuries, whereas the Juliana 
plaintiffs blamed federal policy decisions over a span of fifty years.404   
Last, the court determined it was unable to redress the plaintiffs’ injuries.405 The first de-
termination was that addressing emissions alone would not solve climate change.406 The court 
distinguished this case from Massachusetts, stating that because the State of Massachusetts 
 
392 Id. at 1173–74. 
393 Id. at 1166.  
394 Id. at 1166–67.  
395 Id. at 1166.  
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brought a procedural due process claim the threshold was lower for redressability.407 Therefore, it 
was sufficient that the EPA’s regulation of vehicle emissions may only help rather than solve cli-
mate change.408 Juliana relied on a substantive due process claim, so the bar was higher.409 The 
second determination was that enforcing the requested remedial plan to address climate change 
would violate separation of powers.410 The court explained that the judicial branch could not create 
or supervise the creation of policy, but that it must defer this power to the executive and legislative 
branches.411 While the court acknowledged that climate change is a “clear and present danger” that 
must be addressed, the judiciary is not the appropriate forum for creating change.412 The opinion 
concluded that the record makes it increasingly difficult for “the political branches to deny that 
climate change is occurring, that the government has had a role in causing it, and that our elected 
officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions.”413 Some legal scholars hope that the Su-
preme Court may review Juliana because the Ninth Circuit conflated the third element of Article 
III standing with the political question doctrine.414  
Juliana provides hope for pursuing damages against Big Oil in several ways. First, if the 
court acknowledged the government knew fossil fuels caused climate change and its wrongdoing 
contributed to climate change, it makes it easier to show that Big Oil also had knowledge and 
conducted itself similarly. Second, the court acknowledged scientific evidence that climate change 
is occurring, making it more difficult for Big Oil to deny the scientific causation link between its 
emission of fossil fuels and the harms of climate change. Third, the court stated that flooding and 
water scarcity are concrete harms,415 harms which almost every American community has experi-
enced,416 increasing the plaintiff pool. Fourth, the court determined that a causal link existed be-
tween policy decisions made over fifty years ago and the pleaded harms. The court also considered 
the government’s actions to authorize drilling. Similarly, Big Oil has conducted business for over 
100 years and has even more actively participated in fossil fuel extraction than the government.417 
Last, the redressability will be less of an issue when suing Big Oil directly. Ordering a company 
to pay restitution for damages or enforcing injunctions to stop certain business practices are not 
the non-justiciable policy decisions addressed in Juliana. However, Big Oil may still have a chance 
at overcoming a lawsuit if the court believes stopping the industry’s practices, which only relate 
to emissions from one source, will not solve climate change. For example, the Juliana court 
pointed out that experts think several solutions must be combined to address the problem, includ-
ing reforestation, energy-efficient lighting, public transportation, and even hydrogen-powered air-
craft.418 The next Subsection predicts the potential success of climate change claims against Big 
Oil in light of Juliana.    
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B. Climate Change Litigation Against Big Oil 
 
The globe is addicted to fossil fuels.419 America’s addiction is only getting worse, as natural 
gas production has increased 60% between 2008 to 2017, and we are expanding “oil and gas ex-
traction four times faster than any other nation.”420 Similar to the harm caused by tobacco and 
opioids, this addiction has resulted in coastal communities having to pay approximately $400 bil-
lion to adapt their infrastructures to the rising sea levels,421 and 62% of Americans state that climate 
change is affecting their local communities.422 Local and state governments have stepped into a 
role the federal government has refused, as evidenced by seventeen states pledging to uphold the 
Paris Agreement; twelve U.S. cities joined C40, “a global network of cities committed to the Paris 
Agreement and decreasing emissions”; and 400 U.S. mayors committed to implementing climate 
change policies.423 Additionally, local and state governments began suing Big Oil for damages.424   
The impetus for these suits against Big Oil is similar to the tobacco litigation: evidence of 
corporate wrongdoing.425 In 2015, media outlets launched investigations disclosing Exxon “un-
derstood the science of global warming, predicted its catastrophic consequences, and then spent 
millions to promote misinformation.”426 In addition to denying climate change on its own, it 
funded research supporting climate change denial,427 similar to Big Tobacco supporting research 
unlinking lung cancer and tobacco use.428 The media reports prompted the Massachusetts, U.S. 
Virgin Islands, and New York attorneys general to investigate Exxon in 2015 and 2016.429 The 
three attorneys general began serving Exxon with subpoenas and a civil investigative demand 
(“CID”), and Exxon responded with lawsuits in state and federal court causing the U.S. Virgin 
Islands to drop its investigation.430 Despite attempts to derail the investigations, federal courts in 
Massachusetts and New York required Exxon to comply with the investigation in 2018.431 The 
two remaining attorneys general filed complaints against Exxon alleging investor fraud.432 In 2019, 
a New York district court determined that Exxon did not commit investor fraud but concluded that 
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“[n]othing in this opinion is intended to absolve ExxonMobil from responsibility for contributing 
to climate change . . . .”433 Exxon also did not dispute that “its operations produce greenhouse 
gases or that greenhouse gases contribute to climate change.”434 The Massachusetts case has yet 
to be adjudicated.435 The judge stated that the case was more suited for state court because the 
issue was consumer protection law, “not claims of environmental violations that could be pre-
empted by federal law.”436 Exxon was also recently denied a more favorable state forum of Texas 
in a different climate dispute.437 These recent decisions suggest plaintiffs will have a more neutral 
forum to adjudicate their claims. 
The uncovered evidence and impending consequences of rising sea levels inspired numer-
ous cities to file lawsuits against several Big Oil companies under the public nuisance theory used 
in both the tobacco and the opioid litigation in 2017 and 2018.438 The eight California cities and 
counties, Colorado cities, Washington state cities, and the entire State of Rhode Island sued in state 
court and hope to remain there.439 A common tactic used by Big Oil in previous suits was to remove 
to federal court, where the judge would often defer to Congress or the EPA.440 For example, a 2012 
Ninth Circuit case, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., held that an Alaskan village’s 
public nuisance claim against Exxon was preempted by the CAA.441 Oakland’s and San Fran-
cisco’s recent cases were moved to federal court and ultimately dismissed but not before Judge 
Alsup required a climate change tutorial for the courtroom.442 The tutorial consisted of two parts 
and was presented by both sides: the history of climate change and the best currently available 
climate change science.443 The presentation resulted in Judge Alsup stating the court accepted the 
science behind climate change but climate change remedies were best handled by the other 
branches.444 Despite the dismissal, the courtroom presentation gained notable publicity from the 
New York Times, The Guardian, and other media outlets.445 Additionally, Judge Alsup’s ingenious 
method to have both sides present evidence of climate change resulted in BP, Chevron Corpora-
tion, ConocoPhillips, and Shell filing documents admitting knowledge of fossil fuels leading to a 
sea-level increase.446 Exxon filed separately but still admitted that human activities, including the 
combustion of oil and natural gas, lead to climate change.447 Therefore, Kivalina centered on the 
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legal issue of “whether these producers of fossil fuels should pay for anticipated harm that will 
eventually flow from a rise in sea level,” not whether climate change is actually occurring.448   
This case is also important because the plaintiffs figured out how to argue around Big Oil’s 
previous preemption defense. The plaintiffs did not bring claims for the emissions, but rather “for 
having put fossil fuels into the flow of international commerce.”449 The court commented that it 
was not enough to distinguish domestic sales from emissions because the ultimate harm is caused 
by the emissions, not the extraction and sale of fossil fuels.450 Instead, the important element was 
that, “unlike AEP and Kivalina, which sought only to reach domestic conduct, plaintiffs’ claims 
here attack behavior worldwide.”451 This distinction is important because these “foreign emissions 
are out of the EPA and CAA’s reach.”452  
However, Judge Alsup still dismissed the case for the same reason as Juliana’s dismissal, 
determining that the judiciary is the incorrect branch to address climate change.453 The judge’s 
dismissal is surprising because the plaintiffs’ requested remedy was money to pay for seawalls and 
other climate change abatement infrastructure, not a policy-making injunction, like the remedy in 
Juliana.454 Several steps led the court to this holding. First, the plaintiffs’ choice to include global 
implications and the focus on coastal flooding precluded its public nuisance claim from proceeding 
in state court because foreign governance and navigable waters are “uniquely federal.”455 Second, 
the federal common law of an intentional nuisance balances the benefit of action with the harm.456 
The court reasoned that while it is “true that carbon dioxide released from fossil fuels has caused 
(and will continue to cause) global warming,” everyone has benefitted from the “development of 
our modern world . . . fueled by oil.”457 Big Oil’s actions were therefore reasonable, and the public 
nuisance claim failed.458 This reasoning makes sense when comparing fossil fuels to tobacco and 
opioids, both of which had little benefit to society, one being a recreational drug and the other 
being a drug that provides pain relief. For both products, it is impossible to make an argument that 
everyone benefitted from them in the same way as fossil fuels. The minor benefits of smoking459 
and opioids460 in no way outweigh the harms already discussed in this Article. 
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Third, the court did not agree that the following exception to the benefit/burden rule applied 
to this case: “the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating 
for this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.”461 
It determined that granting the plaintiffs’ remedy of $2 billion for each city would establish prec-
edent leading other plaintiffs to file suit, making it infeasible for Big Oil to operate.462 Therefore, 
the court determined it must weigh the benefits and deny the public nuisance claim.463 Perhaps the 
motivation behind the tobacco suits was to make it so those companies can no longer operate and 
create the dangerous product. Similarly, opioid lawsuits sent Purdue Pharma into bankruptcy.464 
Disrupting Big Oil’s business to this degree may not be an option to solve climate change without 
viable and widespread alternative energy sources.465 As of 2019, climate change litigants’ re-
quested damages equaling approximately $200 billion.466 A Columbia law student determined that 
the combined assets of Big Oil will not cover these damages.467       
Fourth, the court took issue with the cities asking for preemptive abatement because it 
determined that Big Oil would still be in business when the cities build the infrastructure, and the 
plaintiffs should sue at that time.468 The court also considered that “[t]he United States Army Corps 
of Engineers has already proposed projects to address the problem and is likely to help protect 
plaintiffs’ property and residents.”469 Although the court agrees that the harm would occur,470 it 
concluded that the harm does not reach the level of imminence of the opioid and tobacco harms 
where people were already dying and the funding for health-care costs were already incurred and 
were undoubtedly going to continue.471 However, compare to Juliana, which allowed standing for 
having to evacuate homes for flooding or scarcity of water.472 Surely, the cities that need this 
infrastructure built can show that at some point a natural disaster caused their citizens to evacuate 
their homes, or they have already incurred costs for other abatement methods besides the infra-
structure they are requesting money for. In Juliana, the remedy was a policy-enforcing injunction, 
and the harm considered concrete and actualized by the court was evacuating homes.473 Therefore, 
the harm does not have to exactly match up with the remedy as suggested here.       
 Fifth, the court said the outcome of the public nuisance claim did not really matter because 
“these claims are foreclosed by the need for federal courts to defer to the legislative and executive 
branches when it comes to such international problems.”474 The court’s reasoning is laid out below:  
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Here, plaintiffs seek to impose liability on five companies for their production and 
sale of fossil fuels worldwide. These claims—through which plaintiffs request bil-
lions of dollars to abate the localized effects of an inherently global phenomenon—
undoubtedly implicate the interests of countless governments, both foreign and do-
mestic. The challenged conduct is, as far as the complaints allege, lawful in every 
nation. And, as the United States aptly notes, many foreign governments actively 
support the very activities targeted by plaintiffs’ claims. Nevertheless, plaintiffs 
would have a single judge or jury in California impose an abatement fund as a result 
of such overseas behavior. Because this relief would effectively allow plaintiffs to 
govern conduct and control energy policy on foreign soil, we must exercise great 
caution.475 
 
“As explained above, plaintiffs’ claims require a balancing of policy concerns—including the 
harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions, our industrialized society’s dependence on fossil 
fuels, and national security.”476 Therefore, my prediction mentioned in Section V.A was incorrect. 
The fact that plaintiffs were suing Big Oil for the narrow remedy of funding local abatements, 
rather than the government for the broad remedy of enforcing policy, did not affect the justiciabil-
ity analysis. However, Judge Alsup issued this opinion in 2018, prior to the 2020 Juliana decision, 
and decided it in a district court within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.477 The cities appealed Judge 
Alsup’s holding, so perhaps there will be a different outcome post-Juliana.478 In fact, King County 
near Seattle, Washington, stayed its federal proceedings pending a decision in the Ninth Circuit 
regarding Judge Alsup’s holding.479 
 City of New York v. B.P. P.L.C., a public nuisance claim in federal court, was also dismissed 
in 2018 for the same reasons as California v. B.P. P.L.C. discussed above.480 However, part of the 
opinion provides hope for the public nuisance claims recently allowed in state court for the state 
of Rhode Island,481 the city of Baltimore, Maryland,482 six California cities and counties, 483 and 
Boulder, Colorado.484 New York stated that the CAA would not preempt the state public nuisance 
claims.485 Therefore, plaintiffs do not have to rely on the foreign implication argument to overcome 
the CAA in state court. The removal of the global component from their argument makes it harder 
for the court to defer to the executive and legislative branches, because the issue is no longer 
related to foreign policy.486 Litigants and legal scholars are hopeful that the state claims will be 
 
475 Id. at 11 (citations omitted).  
476 Id. at 10.  
477 Id. at 1.  
478 Hasemyer, supra note 424; see David Hasemyer, 2 City Lawsuits Against Big Oil Dismissed, but That’s Not 
the End of It, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jun. 26, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27062018/california-cities-
climate-change-lawsuits-dismissed-fossil-fuels-industry-rising-sea-levels/ [https://perma.cc/S9ZQ-W3ZY] [hereinaf-
ter 2 City Lawsuits]. 
479 King Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. C18-758-RSL, 2018 WL 9440497, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2018).  
480 City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).  
481 Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 152 (D.R.I. 2019).  
482 Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 574 (D. Md. 2019).  
483 County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
484 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 947, 981 (D. Colo. 
2019). 
485 BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474. 
       486 See California v. BP P.L.C., Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).  
Volume 8 The Opioid Crisis or Climate Change 2021 
 
 68 
much more successful than the federal ones, as public nuisance claims tend to be much more fa-
vorable to plaintiffs at the state level.487 One cited example is a recent California public nuisance 
claim against lead paint manufacturers that resulted in a $1 billion payout.488 However, relying on 
this case is an issue because of the benefit/burden analysis required in intentional public nuisance 
cases, as lead paint surely does not proffer the same benefit as fossil fuels.     
However, there is still a chance these cases could end up in federal court, as all of the 
defendants have appealed.489 Judge Martinez of Boulder, Colorado, stated that while a climate 
change case could “benefit from a uniform standard of decision, [the defendants] have not met 
their burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists,” and remanded the case to state court.490 
Judge Martinez’s statement directly conflicts with California, allowing the same Big Oil defend-
ants to remove to federal court because “[a] patchwork of fifty different answers to the same fun-
damental global issue would be unworkable.”491 With some circuits allowing the cases to proceed 
in state courts, and others not, there is a potential for a circuit split requiring guidance from the 
Supreme Court.  
 
C. Applying the Framework 
 
 Examining the current state of the climate change litigation requires applying the six signs 
of success from the tobacco suit. The first sign of success is the possibility of a large settlement 
agreement. For the longest time, Big Oil has hidden behind the federal court deferring to the other 
branches and the preemption of public nuisance claims under the CAA. Juliana, California, and 
New York suggest that the federal courts are still likely to defer to the other branches of govern-
ment. Therefore, new hope is rooted in the public nuisance claims proceeding in state court because 
an increased likelihood of the courts holding Big Oil accountable will convince the companies to 
settle. However, there are issues with the state cases because of the benefit/burden analysis under 
intentional public nuisance claims. Fossil fuels are unlike tobacco, opioids, and lead paint in that 
they have benefitted everyone in society. The exception to the benefit/burden analysis requires Big 
Oil’s conduct cause serious harm and that “the financial burden of compensating for this and sim-
ilar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.”492 In other words, 
a court will only avoid the benefit/burden analysis if paying for a plaintiff’s and future plaintiff’s 
damages does not prevent Big Oil from continuing operations. Calculations suggest that paying 
the $200 billion in current pleaded damages is not feasible for Big Oil. However, what if the dam-
ages were non-monetary? Plaintiffs could instead require Big Oil to take affirmative measures to 
help prevent global warming from surpassing two degrees Celsius by expanding its renewable 
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portfolio by a required increasing percentage each year and lessening emissions by a certain per-
centage each year.493 This solution could either be pursued through public nuisance litigation or a 
settlement agreement following the MSA’s regulatory components without the yearly payments. 
Adhering to an injunction or settlement requirements would prevent the infrastructure abatements 
from even being required because lessening the global temperature would prevent the flooding, 
which current climate litigants are suing Big Oil to abate, from even occurring.494 However, with-
out pleading a non-monetary injunction it is unclear if the state suits will even be successful be-
cause the courts are not willing to risk Big Oil becoming non-operational. It is also unclear if the 
suits will remain in state court due to the circuit split. On the flip side, courts may see non-monetary 
injunctions as a form of policy-making. Without the threat of plaintiffs succeeding in court, Big 
Oil is unlikely to negotiate a settlement.  
The second sign of success is evidence of corporate wrongdoing. A positive element of 
climate change litigation is that courts and Big Oil now accept that climate change is occurring 
and agree it is scientifically supported.495 Additionally, suits are pending regarding Exxon’s 
knowledge of climate change.496 Recently, Boulder, Colorado’s state case added a civil conspiracy 
claim against Exxon and Suncor for “promot[ing] the use of fossil fuels while dismissing the con-
sequences of climate change.”497 While an investor fraud suit against Exxon failed, another is 
pending and two attorneys general investigations into the company were allowed to proceed.498 
Discovery of incriminating documents between the two investigations and the pending litigations 
could also influence Big Oil or Exxon alone to negotiate settlement agreements.     
The third sign of success is a change in public opinion. The climate litigation so far has 
influenced a change in public opinion regarding the responsibility of Big Oil and the validity of 
climate change. Similar to fast food companies’ “healthy” marketing, public backlash in the 2000s 
encouraged BP to completely overhaul its brand to “Beyond Petroleum,” complete with a new 
green logo and a promise to diversify its portfolio with renewable projects.499 This marketing ploy 
did not stick around as the green logo is gone along with its large wind farm project, and BP has 
the measly goal of 15% renewables by 2040.500 However, recent events suggest BP should have 
stuck to the green marketing.501 In addition to courts agreeing there is scientific evidence of climate 
change, Harvard, Yale, University of Michigan, and New York University law students protested 
the firm Paul Weiss at four separate recruiting events for representing Exxon in the current litiga-
tion.502 Also, activists like Greta Thunberg, a teenage Swedish environmental activist, “has elec-
trified millions of students around the world with her climate school-strike movement.”503 “The 
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strikes, along with the Extinction Rebellion’s civil disobedience campaign, are aimed at compel-
ling governments and big polluters to take action to prevent ecological collapse, and are doing a 
credible job in turning the oil companies into pariahs.”504 These public displays seem to be hurting 
business as Suncor, the largest Alberta oil-sands operator, is having trouble finding investors.505 
Last, the heavy publicity surrounding cases such as Juliana and the climate change tutorial from 
California is likely to sway the public’s opinion regarding the culpability of Big Oil and the valid-
ity of climate change. If public pressure mounts, that could sway Big Oil to make internal changes 
like BP did years ago. However, the fear is that these changes would only be empty marketing 
promises.  
The fourth sign of success is new courtroom avenues. The climate change litigation shows 
this sign of success because of the suits regarding Exxon’s investor fraud, similar to the RICO 
claims in Big Tobacco, and the potential for the new state cases. The fifth sign of success is influ-
encing a body of legislation. Massachusetts encouraged the EPA to regulate emissions and Juliana 
holds that it would be hard for the other branches to ignore climate change and to deny that the 
government played a role in exacerbating it.506 The ability of this Ninth Circuit opinion to influence 
legislation was low under Trump’s administration, which ignored the holding of Massachusetts, a 
Supreme Court decision.507 However, there may be a possibility of more legislation as President 
Biden has recently rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement and his administration has pledged to 
create “new emissions-cutting target, known as a Nationally Determined Contribution, which will 
determine the scope of the country’s ambitious goals over the next decade.”508   
The sixth sign of success is the ability to aggregate claims. This sign is apparent because 
cities are suing on behalf of their citizens. However, California presents some issues in regard to 
identifying a plaintiff’s imminent harm. The court determined that the city’s pleaded harm was not 
imminent because it had yet to build the abatements it was seeking money for, and another gov-
ernment entity was already helping with the abatements.509 In the New York case that was dis-
missed, this timing issue was not discussed, likely because the city pleaded damages based on 
abatements implemented after hurricane Sandy.510 Therefore, so long as parties plead with harm 
already incurred, as the New York and Juliana plaintiffs did, the harm element should be satisfied.   
In conclusion, the public nuisance cases recently remanded to state court, evidence of 
Exxon’s knowledge of climate change, courts recognizing that climate change is backed by sci-
ence, the change in public opinion, and cities representing its citizens are all evidence of climate 
change being a successful social policy tort. All of these components have worked together to 
diminish Big Oil’s power and to bring public attention to this issue. However, because the Juliana 
case pled that a suitable environment is a fundamental right and the district court recognized it as 
such,511 climate change could also fall into the social impact litigation category of cases like Brown 
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v. Board and Roe v. Wade.512 This is because the solution to climate change is not Big Oil funding 
cities’ abatement structures; instead, that is just one component. In fact, the need for abatement 
could be completely prevented if policy is enacted to prevent the increase in global temperature.513 
The fact that a successful settlement agreement similar to the MSA could be enacted between local 
governments and Big Oil without requiring large payouts suggests that this problem is better 
solved with policy rather than the large payouts usually required for a successful social policy tort. 
Climate change litigation is different from opioid litigation because most of the opioid suits are 
based on harm already incurred that can only be resolved with funding for treatment programs514 
in conjunction with regulations preventing additional harm. Another difference is that fossil fuels 
are still an essential product,515 so turning Big Oil non-operational is not an option like it was for 
the tobacco or opioid suits. Last, local abatement of potential rising waters is only one small com-
ponent of solving climate change. Other countries have recognized this by enacting carbon taxes516 
and participating in policies such as the Paris Climate Agreement.517 Another solution is allowing 
the market to lower emissions.518 In 2019, greenhouse gas emissions dropped 2% because natural 
gas was cheaper than coal.519 While this alone does not solve climate change, it shows that there 
might be better options besides social policy tort litigation. Overall, the climate change litigation 
has played a positive role in getting the public and courts to accept the scientific evidence backing 
climate change. The suits also damaged Big Oil’s reputation and made the courts acknowledge 
that the government contributed to climate change. However, climate change is not likely to suc-
ceed under the tobacco model because it is unlikely to result in a settlement agreement like the 




The opioid crisis and climate change have elements indicating potential success under the 
tobacco litigation model. Citizens took both social issues to court after feeling the government was 
not doing enough to right substantial harms caused by corporations. Additionally, both litigations 
led to an increase in public awareness and evidence of corporate wrongdoing. While both show 
promise, the opioid litigation is more likely to succeed under the tobacco litigation model. First, 
climate change public nuisance suits are currently pending in state court, whereas a drug manufac-
turer was found liable for public nuisance in a state court. Second, harmed cities and states have 
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reached settlements in the opioid litigation, but not in the climate change litigation. Third, federal 
courts are unwilling to adjudicate climate change issues, while a federal court created an MDL and 
the negotiation class for the opioid litigation. These three differences show that the opioid litigation 
seems more like the third wave of the tobacco litigation, while climate change may be stuck in the 
first or second wave.   
A few key differences between the social issues explain why the opioid litigation is more 
likely to succeed under the tobacco litigation model. The first is that America still relies on Big 
Oil’s products, so it is not feasible to bankrupt or make the companies non-operational. In contrast, 
90% of Purdue’s business was manufacturing and selling OxyContin.520 While some of the opioid 
defendants make beneficial products, the opioid plaintiffs got around that fact by only damaging 
the responsible subsidiary company. For example, Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiaries Noramco and 
Tasmanian Alkaloids were the companies growing poppies to supply opioid manufacturers, and 
Mallinckrodt only filed bankruptcy for its American subsidiary for its tentative settlement agree-
ment.521 The second difference is that Big Oil and the federal government are almost equally 
blamed for climate change, while there is evidence that opioid defendants lobbied for laws to di-
minish the DEA’s enforcement tools. This leads to the third difference—the politicization of cli-
mate change makes it nearly impossible for a court to be willing to adjudicate, whereas the opioid 
crisis is not politicized. Despite the climate-change plaintiffs showing discrete, local harms (like 
rising sea levels), courts still believe issuing damages to one local government will have global 
effects.   
However, climate change must be distinguished from fast food. Climate-change litigants 
have made significant strides. Courts and Big Oil both acknowledge that climate change is ongo-
ing, is backed by scientific evidence, and emissions contributed to the problem. A federal court 
allowed a climate change demonstration in court, and another granted standing for a class action 
of children to sue the government. Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed Juliana, the court still 
agreed that climate change was occurring and suggested the other branches of government can no 
longer ignore it. Recent public nuisance claims brought by local governments that were remanded 
to state court show promise, but the reality is that localized abatement of harms will not solve 
climate change. In fact, paying for abatement structures may distract from the more direct solution: 
lowering the global temperature. The plaintiffs behind Juliana had a great idea to seek the refuge 
of the judicial branch in hopes to succeed under the social impact model as seen in Brown v. 
Board.522 The hope is that the Supreme Court will consider a stable climate a fundamental right, 
as the Oregon district court did in Juliana, and determine that the government violates the due 
process clause if it ignores its “special duty . . . to use [its] statutory and regulatory authority to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions” or if it makes decisions that directly infringe on the fundamental 
right.523 While the Court has not been as policy oriented as it was in the 1960s when Brown was 
decided, the hope is that the circuit split regarding whether climate change public nuisance claims 
belong in state or federal court will catch the Court’s attention. Additionally, the fact that the Ninth 
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Circuit may have conflated the third element of standing with the political question doctrine may 
force the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.524     
The opioid crisis is more likely to succeed under the tobacco litigation model because 
plaintiffs are adapting the model to meet their needs. A major critique of the MSA was that the 
funds were not properly distributed to local cities. The opioid litigation is mending that by includ-
ing local governments in the opioid MDL and allowing 98% of American cities to participate in 
the first negotiation class. Settlements in Oklahoma, Ohio, and Kentucky already funneled funds 
straight into abatement.525 The tentative $1.6 billion settlement with Mallinckrodt and forty-seven 
attorneys general suggests litigants have worked out how to utilize the MDL, the negotiation class, 
and the attorneys’ general suits to ensure Big Pharma repays every harmed community. Repaying 
those harmed, whether through a global settlement or several settlements, is the ultimate goal of 
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